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Strategic and Secure Interactions in Networks
Abstract
The goal of this dissertation is to understand how network plays a role in shaping certain strategic interactions,
in particular biased voting and bargaining, on networks; and to understand how interactions can be made
secure when they are constrained by the network topology. Our works take an interdisciplinary approach by
drawing on theories and models from economics, sociology, as well as computer science, and using
methodologies that include both theories and behavioral experiments. First, we consider biased voting in
networks, which models distributed collective decision making processes where individuals on a network
must balance between their private biases or preferences with a collective goal of consensus. Our study of this
problem is two-folded. On the theoretical side, we start by introducing a diffusion model called biased voter
model, which is a natural extension of the classic voter model. Among other results, we show in the presence
of private biases, no matter how small, there exists certain networks where it takes exponential time to
converge to a consensus through distributed interaction in networks. This is a stark and interesting contrast to
the well-known result that it always takes polynomial time to converge in the voter model, when there are no
private biases. On the experimental side, a group human subjects were arranged in various carefully designed
virtual networks to solve the biased voting problem. Along with analyses of how collective and individual
performance vary with network structure and incentives generally, we find there are well-studied network
topologies in which the minority preference consistently wins globally, and that the presence of “extremist”
individuals, or the awareness of opposing incentives, reliably improve collective performance Second, we
consider bargaining in networks, which has long been studied by economists and sociologists. A basic premise
behind the many theoretical study of bargaining in networks is that pure topological differences in agents’
network positions endow them with different bargaining power. As a complementary to these theories, we
again conducted a series of highly controlled behavioral experiments, where human subjects were arranged in
various carefully designed virtual networks to playing bargaining games. Along with other findings of how
individual and collective performance vary with network structures and individual playing styles, we find that
the number of neighbors one can negotiate with confers bargaining power, whereas the limit on the number of
deals one can close undermines it, and we find that competitions from distant part of the network that are
invisible locally also play a significant and subtle role in shaping bargaining powers. And last, we consider the
question of how interactions in networks can be made secure. Traditional methods and tools from
cryptography, for example secure multi-party computation, can be applied only if each party can talk to
everyone else directly; but cannot be directly applied if interactions are distributed over a network without
completely eradicating the distributed nature. We develop a general ‘compiler’ that turns each algorithm from
a broad class collectively known as message-passing algorithms into a secure one that has exactly the same
functionality and communication pattern. And we show a fundamental trade-off between preserving the
distributed nature of communication and the level of security one can hope for.
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ABSTRACT
STRATEGIC AND SECURE INTERACTIONS IN NETWORKS
Jinsong Tan
Michael Kearns
The goal of this dissertation is to understand how network plays a role in shaping cer-
tain strategic interactions, in particular biased voting and bargaining, on networks; and to
understand how interactions can be made secure when they are constrained by the network
topology. Our works take an interdisciplinary approach by drawing on theories and models
from economics, sociology, as well as computer science, and using methodologies that include
both theories and behavioral experiments.
First, we consider biased voting in networks, which models distributed collective decision
making processes where individuals in a network must balance between their private biases
or preferences with a collective goal of consensus. Our study of this problem is two-folded.
On the theoretical side, we start by introducing a diffusion model called biased voter model,
which is a natural extension of the classic voter model. Among other results, we show
in the presence of biases, no matter how small, there exists certain networks where it takes
exponential time to converge to a consensus through distributed interaction in networks. This
is a stark and interesting contrast to the well-known result that it always takes polynomial
time to converge in the voter model, when there are no biases. On the experimental side, a
group human subjects were arranged in various carefully designed virtual networks to solve
the biased voting problem. Along with analyses of how collective and individual performance
vary with network structure and incentives generally, we find there are well-studied network
topologies in which the minority preference consistently wins globally, and that the presence
of “extremist” individuals, or the awareness of opposing incentives, reliably improve collective
performance
Second, we consider bargaining in networks, which has long been studied by economists
v
and sociologists. A basic premise behind the many theoretical study of bargaining in net-
works is that pure topological differences in agents’ network positions endow them with dif-
ferent bargaining power. Complementary to these theories, we conduct a series of controlled
behavioral experiments, where human subjects were arranged in various carefully designed
virtual networks to playing bargaining games. Along with other findings of how individual
and collective performance vary with network structures and individual playing styles, we
find that the number of neighbors one can negotiate with confers bargaining power, whereas
the limit on the number of deals one can close undermines it, and we find that competitions
from distant parts of the network, though invisible locally, also play a significant and subtle
role in shaping bargaining powers.
And last, we consider the question of how interactions in networks can be made secure.
Traditional methods and tools from cryptography, for example secure multi-party compu-
tation, can be applied only if each party can talk to everyone else directly; but cannot
be directly applied if interactions are distributed over a network without completely erad-
icating the distributed nature. We develop a general ‘compiler’ that turns each algorithm
from a broad class collectively known as message-passing algorithms into a secure one that
has exactly the same functionality and communication pattern. And we show a fundamen-
tal trade-off between preserving the distributed nature of communication and the level of
security one can hope for.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Commercial aviation based international travelling can make an outbreak of flu in a distant
village a worldwide pandemic in a matter of weeks, the word-of-mouth campaign run on
friendship based social networks can have significant influences over the success of a new
product or the outcome of an election, the interconnectedness of a country’s power grid can
expose it to the kind of vulnerability where the failure of a single power line can knock out
power supply and wreak havoc in millions of people’s lives.
All these phenomena share a common structural underpinning: Our modern society is
connected in myriad and complex ways through technology, and such connectedness often
comes with profound implications not yet fully understood. A particularly life altering ex-
ample is the proliferation of the Internet during the past decade: The Web democratizes the
creation of information and makes its dissemination faster than ever before, the populariza-
tion of social networking sites like Facebook transforms our notion of privacy, and online
shopping sites such as eBay and Amazon revolutionize the way sellers interact with buyers.
These networks are often inherently technological, social and economic at the same time,
therefore to fully understand them one needs to draw on theories, models and methodologies
from economics, sociology, as well as computer science.
In response to the increasingly important role network plays in our modern life, one line
of efforts that is generally known as social network theory has undergone fast development
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in the past decade. Social network theory has traditionally been mainly concerned with the
observation and measurement of structural properties and patterns of naturally occurring
networks, and in turn having the empirical understanding thus gained inform the invention
of generative models that can reproduce various kind of structural properties that seem to
be ubiquitous in these naturally occurring networks.
Properties as such include for example having a giant component, meaning the vast
majority of nodes in a network are connected, either directly or through other nodes; and
small diameter, which means the average distance between any two nodes in a given network
tends to be extremely small when it is compared to the size of the network; and scale-
free distribution, meaning that the degree distribution of the nodes follows a power law
distribution. Correspondingly, generative models have been invented in social network theory
to reproduce these properties: Erdös and Rényi proposed the random graph model [29, 30,
13], probably the simplest probabilistic model one can think of where edges between nodes
are generated independently with a constant probability, that explains how giant component
can suddenly emerge from a network if the edge density across certain threshold; the small-
world model developed by Watts and Strogatz [83], which starts with a ring lattice and then
rewire some of the local connection to random distant nodes, naturally generate networks
with small diameters; and the preferential attachment model invented by Barabási and Albert
[7], where new nodes are introduced to the network sequentially and randomly attached to
existing nodes with probability proportional to their degrees, generates networks with a
power law degree distribution.
Despite the success of these and many other generative models in reproducing many of the
statistical properties and patterns observed in naturally occurring networks, they in general
do not model the nodes in the networks as intelligent and strategic beings who act in their
own interests, but mindless automatons who only make decisions in a purely probabilistic
or mechanical fashion.
This hampers our ability in modeling and analyzing the dynamics of interactions that
2
occur in the networks we are interested in, which are often inherently social and economic. It
is thus natural for one to turn to economics, and in particular game theory, for the languages
and tools to describe and analyze these networks.
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that attempts to model strategic in-
teractions between rational and self-interested beings, which in game-theoretic terminology
are known as agents. Traditional models in game theory consider situations where there are
n agents, and each agent interacts directly with everyone else and has to take into account
the actions everyone else might take when making his own in order to maximize his own
benefit. Although in principle one can use models like this to describe strategic interactions
in a network where only local interactions matter, it quickly becomes extremely cumbersome
as the population size grows larger because it takes space exponential in n to just describe
the game. To circumvent this problem, Kearns, Littman and Singh in their seminal work
[54] introduced graphical games as a succinct language to describe strategic interactions in
networks. In a graphical game, a network is imposed exogenously on the n agents, and each
agent, still being fully rational and self-interested, can now only interact with his immediate
neighbors in the network and only have to take into account his neighbors actions in order
to optimize his own. The graphical game model not only offers tremendous efficiency in
describing games in networks by reducing descriptional complexity from exponential in n to
exponential in k, where k is the degree of the graph and can be extremely small compared
to n, but also provides us with a fresh perspective in looking at and understanding social
and economic networks.
Subsequent and related works have taken a step further to try to blend the two fields
of social network theory and game theory. One line of research generally known as network
formation games [34, 4, 2, 32, 72, 47, 31, 43, 33, 64, 65, 5, 8] sought to understand how the
topology of social and economic networks could have arisen from and shaped by various kind
of strategic interactions between self-interested agents. Another line takes networks as given
exogenously, and focus on implications of network topology on dynamics, e.g. diffusion
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of information or disease (see [79] for an overview of the topic), and games, e.g. trading
[50, 33, 12], bargaining [27, 15, 63, 20, 51], on networks.
The first part of this dissertation continues the line of research that study games and
dynamics in networks. We consider two kinds of strategic interactions, namely biased voting
and bargaining in networks, which we give a brief overview in Section 1.1.
1.1 Strategic Interactions in Networks
1.1.1 Biased Voting in Networks
Many collective decision-making or voting processes in politics, business, and other arenas
must balance diverse individual preferences with a desire for collective unity. Such processes
often take place in social or organizational networks, in which individuals are most influenced
by, or aware of, the current views of their network neighbors. A recent, if approximate,
example of this phenomenon is the 2008 Democratic National Primary race in the United
States. On the one hand, individual voters held opposing and sometimes strong preferences
that were apparently very nearly balanced across the population; on the other hand, there
was a strong and explicit desire among them that once the winning candidate was identified,
the entire party should unify behind that candidate.
We formalize such settings as a biased voting problem over an undirected graph, whose
local structure models the social influences acting on individual voters. Our model contrasts
with the significant literature on diffusion of opinion in social networks as it is the first to
study this topic in the presence of both private bias and strong incentives toward collective
unity. The theoretical analyses of our model yielded an interesting insight: No matter how
infinitesimal the bias is, a broad class of stochastic opinion diffusion processes, which includes
natural generalizations of the well-studied voter model, takes exponential time to converge to
consensus on some networks. And this is in stark contrast to the well-known result that the
voter model, which is studied in the absence of private biases, always takes polynomial time
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to converge to consensus on any network. On the other hand, we propose a simple and local
stochastic updating protocol that provably converges to the collectively preferred consensus
in polynomial time on any network even in the presence of biases. And we further extend
this protocol to a strategic setting where individual may have incentives to deviate from the
prescribed protocol, and showed the new protocol is an approximate Nash equilibrium of the
resulting game.
Complementary to the theoretical work, an extensive session of behavioral experiments on
biased voting in networks of individuals were conducted. In each of 81 experiments, 36 human
subjects arranged in a virtual network were financially motivated to reach global consensus
to one of two opposing choices. No payments were made unless the entire population reached
a unanimous decision within 1 minute, but different subjects were paid more for consensus
to one choice or the other, and subjects could view only the current choices of their network
neighbors, thus creating tensions between private incentives and preferences, global unity,
and network structure. Along with analyses of how collective and individual performance
vary with network structures and incentives generally, our key findings include the following:
• There are well-studied network topologies in which the minority preference consistently
wins globally;
• The presence of “extremist” individuals, or the awareness of opposing incentives, reli-
ably improve collective performance;
• Certain behavioral characteristics of individual subjects, such as “stubbornness” and
“stableness”, are strongly correlated with earnings.
We develop the theoretical work on biased voting in networks in Chapter 2 and the
corresponding behavioral experiments in 3.
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1.1.2 Bargaining in Networks
In Chapter 4 we consider an extensive session of behavioral experiments on bargaining in
social networks.
Bargaining has been studied extensively in economics and sociology, and the popular
setting is of two parties negotiating a single deal. The deal yields a fixed total wealth if
the two parties can agree on how to split it and otherwise both parties receive nothing.
Bargaining in a network is the setting where nodes represent agents, who can close a limited
number of deals, and edges represent bilateral opportunities for deals between neighboring
agents. There has been a long line of previous theoretical work which tried to relate wealth
to network topology, and a notable feature of these theories is the prediction that there
may be significant local variation in splits purely as a result of the imposed deal limits and
structural asymmetries in the network. Our experiments constitute a test of human subjects’
actual behaviors in this game and are among the first and largest behavioral experiments on
network effects in bargaining conducted to date.
Our key findings pertaining to existing network bargaining theory include the following:
• Deals are often struck with unequal shares, though more than one-third of the deals
are equally shared;
• Higher degree tends to raise bargaining power, while higher deal limits tend to decrease
bargaining power; on the other hand, higher deal limits in the first neighborhood tend
to raise bargaining power whereas higher degrees in the first neighborhood tend to
lower it;
• Local topology affects bargains, but invisible competition in other parts of the network
also affects it, even when the local topologies are indistinguishable.
Other findings that speak to no existing theory are the following:
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• Social efficiency is positively correlated with inequality of the deals;
• Social efficiency is higher in the presence of uncertainty;
• Deals left unclosed due to failure to agree form the greater part of missing efficiency.
• People who are patient bargainers tend to make more money.
These findings are in need of theoretical development and they are among the future
research areas I will pursue. The nature and the potential implications of these findings argue
for the further need to integrate the fields of economics, game theory, sociology, psychology,
and computer science.
1.2 Secure Interaction in Networks
In the second part of the dissertation, we turn our attention to security issues arising from
interactions on networks.
1.2.1 Network Faithful Secure Computation
As the use of technology permeate through our modern life, sharing details of personal or
other sensitive information in social networks is becoming an increasingly prevalent practice.
Through an important class of highly distributed protocols on graphs known broadly as
message-passing algorithms, which only requires direct information sharing between local
neighbors in a network, each node in the network can compute sophisticated aggregated
global functions of the whole population. While doing so has the benefit of allowing one
to obtain useful information without directly revealing sensitive information to the entire
population, it is almost always the case that one reveals information beyond what is intended
during the process.
Consider, for example, a large social network in which each node represents an individual
and each edge represents a relationship between individuals. Imagine that each party in this
network would like to compute his or her own probability of having contracted a contagious
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disease, which depends on the probabilities that each of his or her neighbors in the network
have been exposed to the disease, and that in turn depend on the exposure probabilities of
the neighbors’ neighbors, so on and so forth. This could be accomplished by running the
standard belief propagation algorithm on the network. However, if the network participants
engage in standard belief propagation, each party will learn much more than his own con-
traction probability. In particular, each party could potentially learn information about the
contraction probabilities of their neighbors, as well as more global information (such as the
fraction of the population that has been infected). Such leakage of information can be highly
undesirable.
Besides belief propagation [78, 85], message passing algorithms comprises of a broad class
of distributed algorithms or protocols that are of great interest in areas such as artificial in-
telligence, machine learning, statistics, and signal process. Notable examples include Gibbs
sampling [18, 37], Nash propagation in graphical games [54, 76], gossip algorithms [14],
survey propagation [16], constraint propagation [28], and many others. Message-passing for-
malisms have long been studied in distributed computing. With rising interest in large-scale,
decentralized networks such as the Internet, message-passing algorithms are of increasing
importance due to their localized communication and their lack of any need for non-local
topological information; in most instances parties do not even need to know the overall size of
the network, yet they can compute sophisticated global functions, such as joint distributions
and Nash equilibria.
The growing prevalence of message-passing algorithms in computation related to social
and economic interactions raises security concerns as mentioned above. To tackle this, one
approach would be to simply apply classic and powerful cryptography tool called secure
multi-party computation [84, 39] to the message-passing algorithms, preserving their input-
output functionality while imbuing them with very strong privacy properties. Unfortunately,
secure multi-party computation requires each party being able to talk directly to everyone
else, which is often impossible due to the enormous size of the population and the lack of
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sufficient communication resources. Even if such communication resources were available, by
requiring all parties to maintain and communicate distributed shares of every computation
even with very “distant” parties in the network, this straightforward approach would largely
eradicate the benefits of the message-passing framework in the first place.
In the second part of this dissertation, we seek to ask the question: Can we design
algorithms that get the best of both worlds? On the one hand, these algorithms need
to preserve the highly distributed, local communication pattern of the original message-
passing algorithms. On the other hand, it comes with (at least some of) the traditional
privacy assurances of secure multi-party computation. We call this network faithful secure
computation.
We answer this question in the affirmative. In Chapter 5, we develop secure versions of
belief propagation and Gibbs sampling by drawing on secure multi-party computation and
other classic tools from cryptography. We then further generalize this result
In Chapter 5 we show not only belief propagation, but also any message-passing algo-
rithms can be made secure. Specifically, we have the following results
• We construct a general compiler that turns any message-passing protocol into one
computing the same functionality, but that is secure against single-party adversaries
(1-privacy).
• We propose a simulation-based definition of what it means for a secure protocol to be
faithful to the original network structure and protocol, and a proof that our compiler
produces extremely faithful 1-private protocols.
• And last we give an impossibility result showing a trade-off between faithfulness and
security against coalitions. In particular, we show that for certain functionalities, any
highly faithful protocol must be vulnerable to collusion by small coalitions, thus proving
the optimality of our compiler with respect to this trade-off.
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Chapter 2
The Networked Biased Voting Prob-
lem
2.1 Introduction
The tension between the expression of individual preferences and the desire for collective
unity appears in decision-making and voting processes in politics, business, and many other
arenas. Furthermore, such processes often take place in social or organizational networks,
in which individuals are most influenced by, or aware of, the current views of their network
neighbors.
The 2008 Democratic National Primary race offers a recent, if approximate, example of
this phenomenon. On the one hand, individual voters held opposing and sometimes strong
preferences that were apparently very nearly balanced across the population; however, there
was a strong and explicit desire that once the winning candidate was identified, the entire
party should unify behind that candidate [86]. Obviously primary voters could be influenced
by many global factors (such as polls and mainstream media) outside the scope of their
individual social and organizational networks, but presumably for many voters these local
influences still played an important and perhaps even dominant role.
Although there is now a significant literature on the diffusion of opinion in social networks
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[62, 42, 81], the topic is typically studied in the absence of any incentives toward collective
unity. In many contagion- metaphor models, individuals are simply more or less susceptible
to “catching” an opinion or fad from their neighbors, and are not directly cognizant of, or
concerned with, the global state. In contrast, we are specifically interested in scenarios in
which individual preferences are present but are subordinate to reaching a unanimous global
consensus.
In this chapter, we formalize such scenarios as the “Networked Biased Voting Problem”
(NBVP) over an undirected graph, whose local structure models the social influences acting
on individual voters. In this model, each voter i is represented by a vertex in the network
and a real-valued weight wi ∈ [0, 1] expressing their preference for one of two candidates or
choices that we shall abstractly call red and blue. Here wi =
1
2
is viewed as indifference
between the two colors, while wi = 0 (red) and wi = 1 (blue) are “extremist” preferences for
one or the other color.
Our overarching goal is to investigate distributed algorithms in which three criteria are
met:
1. Convergence to the Global Preference: If the global average W of the wi is even slightly
bounded away from
1
2
(indifference), then all members of the population should even-
tually settle on the globally preferred choice (i.e. all red if W <
1
2
, all blue if W >
1
2
),
even if it conflicts with their own preferences (party unity).
2. Speed of Convergence: Convergence should occur in time polynomial in the size of the
network.
3. Simplicity and Locality: Voters should employ “simple” algorithms in which they com-
municate only locally in the network via (stochastic) updates to their color choices.
These updates should be “natural” in that they plausibly integrate a voter’s individual
preferences with the current choices of their neighbors, and do not attempt to encode
detailed information, send “signals” to neighbors, etc.
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The first two of these criteria are obviously formally precise. While it might be possible
to formalize the third as well, we choose not to do so here for the sake of brevity and
exposition. However, we are explicitly not interested in algorithms in which (for instance)
voters attempt to encode and broadcast their underlying preferences wi as a series of binary
choices, or similarly unnatural and complex schemes. In particular, in our main protocol
it will be very clear that voters are always updating their current choices in a way that
naturally integrates their own preferences and the statistics of current choices in their local
neighborhood.
We note that the formalization above clearly omits many important features of “real”
elections. Foremost among these is the fact that real elections typically have strong global
coordination and communication mechanisms such as polling, while we require that all com-
munication between participants be entirely local in the network. On the other hand, our
framework does allow for the presence of high-degree individuals, including ones that are
indifferent to the outcome (wi =
1
2
) and can thus act as “broadcasters” of current senti-
ment in their neighborhood. Variation in degrees can also be viewed as a crude model for
the increasing variety of global to local media sources (from “mainstream” publications to
influential blogs to small discussion groups).
There is a large literature on the diffusion of opinion in social networks [42, 81, 62],
but the topic is usually studied in the absence of any force towards collective unity. In
many contagion-metaphor models, individuals are more or less susceptible to “catching” an
opinion or fad from their neighbors, but are not directly concerned with the global outcome.
In contrast, we are specifically interested in scenarios in which individual preferences are
present, but are subordinate to reaching a unanimous global consensus.
Our main results are:
• An impossibility result establishing exponential convergence time for the NBVP for a
broad class of local stochastic updating rules, which includes natural generalizations
of the well-studied “voter model” from the diffusion literature (and which is known to
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converge in polynomial time in the absence of differing individual preferences).
• A new simple and local stochastic updating protocol whose convergence time is prov-
ably polynomial on any instance of the NBVP. This new protocol allows voters to
declare themselves “undecided”, and has a temporal structure reminiscent of periodic
polling or primaries.
• An extension of the new protocol that we prove is an approximate Nash equilibrium
for a game-theoretic version of the NBVP.
Chapter Outline: In the next section, we give a formal definition of the Networked Biased
Voting Problem. In Section 2.3, we review the classic voter model, which is an extremely
simple and natural opinion diffusion process and well studied in the literature. We extend
this model to what we call the biased voter model in Section 2.4, which encompasses a
broad class of protocols or diffusion processes, and show that no protocol from this class
can solve the NBVP. By making slight relaxations to the biased voter model, we give a
protocol in Section 2.5 that efficiently solves NBVP, and another protocol in Section 2.6
that approximately solves a game-theoretic version of NBVP.
2.2 The Networked Biased Voting Problem
The networked biased voting problem (NBVP) is studied over an undirected graph G =
(V,E) with n nodes and m edges, where each node i represents an individual voter. Denote
by N (i) the neighbors of i in G; we always consider i as a neighbor of himself.
There are two competing choices or opinions, that without loss of generality we shall call
blue and red (or b and r for short). A voter i comes with a real-valued weight wi ∈ [0, 1]
expressing his preference for one of the two opinions; without loss of generality, let wi(b) = wi
and wi(r) = 1− wi denote his preference for blue and red, respectively.
Throughout, we make the assumption that one opinion is always collectively preferred to
the other. More formally, we assume there exists a constant ε > 0, which is independent of
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the size of G, such that ∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈V
wi(b)−
∑
i∈V
wi(r)
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε.
We also assume that which opinion is preferred is not known a priori to the nodes and the
goal of the networked biased voting problem is for the entire population to actually figure
this out through a distributed algorithm, or protocol, that is simple and local, and converges
in time polynomial in n to the collectively preferred consensus. Because of the stochastic
nature of the protocol we consider, it is implausible to require that it always converges
to the collectively preferred consensus. Instead, we require the protocol does so with high
probability, by which we mean the probability can differ from 1 by an amount that is at most
exponentially small in n. We summarize the definition of networked biased voting problem
in the following.
Networked Biased Voting Problem (NBVP)
Instance: Given an undirected graph G = (V,E) with n nodes, two opinions {b, r}, and
for each i ∈ V , a preference (wi(b), wi(r)) where wi(b), wi(r) ∈ [0, 1] and wi(b) + wi(r) = 1.
Assume there exists an opinion α ∈ {b, r} such that
∑
iwi(α) >
n
2
+ ε for some constant
ε > 0. α is not known a priori.
Objective: Design a simple and local distributed protocol that in time polynomial in n
lets V converge to α with high probability.
We will consider protocols of the following form:
1. (Initialization) At round 0, each node i in V independently and simultaneously initial-
izes to an opinion in α ∈ {b, r} according to I, a randomized function that maps i’s
local information to an opinion in {b, r}.
2. (Stochastic Updating) At round t ≥ 1, a node i is chosen uniformly at random from V ;
i then picks a neighbor j ∈ N (i) according to a possibly non-uniform distribution over
15
N (i); this distribution is determined by function F , which is a randomized function
whose arguments are i’s local information. i then converts to j’s opinion.
Therefore a protocol is specified by a pair of functions, (I,F). This framework by itself
does not forbid “unnatural” coding behaviors as discussed in the Introduction; however in
the spirit of emphasizing algorithms that are simple and local, we restrict I and F to be
functions that only depend on simple and local information of a node i. In particular,
only the following arguments to either functions are considered: 1) fi, the distribution of
opinions in the neighborhood, where fi(b) and fi(r) represent the fractions of neighbors
currently holding opinion blue and red, respectively; 2) i’s intrinsic preferences wi; 3) i’s
degree di = |N (i)|.
2.3 The Classic Voter Model
The voter model, which was introduced by Clifford and Sudbury [24] and Holley and Liggett
[45], is a well-studied probabilistic stochastic process that models opinion diffusion on social
networks in a most basic and natural way. It consists of a class of protocols that satisfy our
criterion of being simple and local. In fact, this class of protocols is the simplest that we
examine in this paper. A voter model protocol is one where in each round, a node i is picked
uniformly at random from V , and i in turn picks one of his neighbors uniformly at random
and adopts his opinion; it does not specify how the initialization is done. More formally,
Definition 1 (Voter Model). The voter model is a class of protocols of the form (I,F) where
F(fi) = α with probability fi(α), ∀ α ∈ {b, r}.
Importantly, the voter model is a class of protocols in which there are no individual
preferences present at all, and the only concern is with reaching unanimity (to either color).
This is in sharp contrast to the networked biased voting problem that we consider here,
where not only individual preferences are explicitly modelled and reaching the collectively
preferred opinion is desired, but any preferences are subordinate to reaching the collectively
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preferred consensus. Nevertheless, we shall make use of some known results on the voter
model, which we turn to now.
Let Cvm denote the random variable whose value is the time at which a consensus is
reached in a voter model protocol. It can be shown that E(Cvm) = O(log(n) max
i,j
hij), where
hij is the expected hitting time of node j of a random walk starting from node i (see [3] for a
proof of this). This result is established by making an observation that makes a connection
between the voter model protocol and another stochastic process called coalescing random
walk on the same undirected graph G.
Coalescing random walk works as follows: Initially there is a particle on each node, each
following an independent simple random walk (i.e. move to a neighbor uniformly at random)
on G. In each round one particle is picked uniformly at random to make one move, if the
neighboring node it moves to is already occupied by another particle, then these two particles
coalesce into a new particle that is identical to any of the two parent particles and still follows
the same simple random walk on G. It is shown in [3] that coalescing random walk is the
dual process of voter model protocol in the sense that for any t ≥ 0 and for any node i ∈ V ,
the following two probabilities are always the same
1. The probability that a consensus is reached and the consensus color originates from
node i1 after t rounds in the voter model protocol on G;
2. The probability that all the n particles have coalesced into a single particle and this
particle lands on node i after t rounds in the coalescing random walk on G.
On the other hand, it is also well-known that for any graph G with self-loops (i.e. i ∈
N (i)), hij = O(n3) for any node i, j [73], so E(Cvm) = O(n3 log(n)). We summarize this in
the following theorem.
1Note different nodes may have the same initial color, in this case we still treat them as distinct by
differentiating them by their originators — in the voter model protocol it is possible to trace an eventual
consensus back to a node where that color originates from.
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Theorem 1 ([3]). For any initialization, it takes O(n3 log(n)) time in expectation for all the
n nodes to converge to a consensus opinion in a voter model protocol.
This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For any initialization, for any small constant θ > 0,2 after O(n3+θ log(n))
rounds into the voter model protocol, the probability that a consensus has not been reached is
O(1/2n
θ
).
Proof. By Theorem 1, there exists a constant C such that for any initialization, E(Cvm) ≤
Cn3 log(n). Therefore, by Markov’s inequality (see Theorem 11 in Appendix A.1), after
2Cn3 log(n) rounds the probability that a consensus has not been reached is at most 1/2.
Since this is true for any initialization, running the protocol for 2Cn3+θ log(n) rounds can
be view as running the protocol in nθ independent segments, each running for 2Cn3 log(n)
rounds. Therefore, the probability that a consensus is not reach after 2Cn3+θ log(n) rounds
is at most
1
2nθ
.
Denote by π the stationary distribution of a random walk on G, i.e. π(i) =
di
2m
for
all i ∈ V and π(S) =
∑
i∈S
di
2m
for all S ⊂ V . The next theorem also largely follows from
established results in literature.
Theorem 2. Let S ⊂ V be the set of nodes initialized to opinion α in a voter model protocol,
then after O(n3+θ log(n)) rounds the probability that an α-consensus is reached differs from
π(S) by O(1/2n
θ
).
Proof. Note the duality of voter model protocol and coalescing random walk tells us that
the probability that an α-consensus is reached in the voter model protocol is the same as the
probability that all the n particles have coalesced and land on a node from set S. This duality
combined with Corollary 1 shows that there exists constant C such that after Cn3+θ log(n)
2Throughout the rest of the paper, θ will be used as a parameter to the running time of the voter model
protocol and share the same meaning as defined here. It is also assumed that θ < 1.
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rounds the probability that not all n particles have coalesced is exponentially small in n.
Suppose after Cn3+θ log(n) rounds, all the n particles do coalesce, then from this point on
the coalesced particle will follow a simple random walk on G. If we run for another n rounds,
the probability that the particle lands on a node from set S differs from π(S) by O(cn), for
some constant c ∈ (0, 1) by the convergence theorem on Markov chain (see Theorem 13 in
Appendix A.3).
Therefore after Cn3+θ log(n) + n rounds in coalescing random walk the probability that
all the n particles have coalesced into a single particle and this particle lands on a node from
S is
(1−O(1/2nθ))(π(S)±O(cn))
= π(S)±O(cn)− π(S)O(1/2nθ)∓O(cn)O(1/2nθ)
= π(S)−O(1/2nθ),
where the last step follows from θ < 1, an assumption made in the interest of making all the
algorithms discussed in this chapter have a faster running time (note making θ larger can
only decrease the difference between the probability of interest and π(S)).
Now if we apply duality again, it translates to that after Cn3+θ log(n)+n = O(Cn3+θ log(n))
rounds in the voter model protocol the probability that an α-consensus is reached differs from
π(S) by O(1/2n
θ
), an amount that is exponentially small in n.
Theorem 1 and 2 allow us to conclude that after O(n3+θ log(n)) rounds into a voter model
protocol, with high probability some consensus is reached. In particular, let B,R ∈ V be the
set of nodes initialized to blue and red respectively, the probability of reaching a b-consensus
(resp., r-consensus) differs from π(B) (resp., π(R)) by an amount that is exponentially small
in n. Recall our goal in solving the NBVP is to find an efficient protocol that converges to
the collectively preferred consensus with high probability. Since the voter model does not
even consider wi, it is clear that it does not solve the NBVP. (The voter model does not
specify how initialization is done, however it is easy to prove that even if I is allowed to
depend on wi in an arbitrary way, no voter model protocol solves the NBVP.)
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Therefore, the logical next thing to consider in order to solve the NBVP is to allow F
to in addition depend on wi. And this leads us to the natural extension of the classic voter
model that we are going to define in the next section: the biased voter model.
2.4 The Biased Voter Model
Discussion from the previous section reveals that in order to solve the NBVP, it is necessarily
to allow F to depend on wi in addition to fi, so that how an individual changes his opinion
is influenced by his neighbors as well as his own intrinsic preferences. A natural class of F
that reflect an individual’s preference (or bias) are those that let him assume his preferred
opinion α with probability higher than fi(α), which is the probability he assumes opinion α
in the voter model. We call the resulting model the biased voter model and define it formally
as follows.
Definition 2 (Biased Voter Model). The biased voter model is a class of protocols of the
form (I,F) where for some constant ε > 0,
P{F(fi, wi) = α}

≥ min{fi(α) + ε, 1} if wi(α) >
1
2
;
≤ max{fi(α)− ε, 0} otherwise.
and I is allowed to depend on wi in an arbitrary way.
Definition 2 is a generic one which only defines biased updating function F qualitatively
without specifying how exactly it is computed. A natural choice is where each agent plays α
with probability proportional to the product fi(α)wi(α) [8]. In this model an agent balances
their preferences with the behavior of their neighbors in a simple multiplicative fashion and
we call this the multiplicative biased voter model.
We note the extension to the biased voter model in Definition 2 is fairly general in that
F is allowed to include a broad class of local stochastic updating rules that reflect a node’s
preferences; and I is allowed to be arbitrary although it has to be independent of G. These
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seemingly provide us with a lot of power in the design of protocols; but perhaps surprisingly,
in this section we prove that even this broad class of biased voting rules is insufficient to
solve the NBVP:
Theorem 3. No biased voter model protocol (I,F) solves the NBVP in the following sense:
If I initializes a node to its preferred opinion with positive probability, then there exists
graphs where it takes exponential time in expectation for any biased voter model protocol to
reach a consensus; otherwise, there exists settings where it converges to the non-preferred
opinion with probability 1.
Note by our definition, the biased voter model constitutes of only simple and local pro-
tocols where I can only depend on a node’s local information. In particular, I cannot be
a function of n. Therefore, although Theorem 3 shows that no protocol from the class that
we are interested in (i.e. the biased voter model) can solve the NBVP, it does not rule out
more complicated protocols where I can be dependent on more global information.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. In Section A.1, we prove a technical lemma
about a certain Markov chain that can be represented by a line graph. We then use this
lemma to prove Theorem 3 in 2.4.2, by constructing an example on a line graph where for
any voter model protocol (I,F), it either takes exponential time to converge to the globally
preferred color, or convergence is to the globally non-preferred color, both violations of the
NBVP requirements. A similar result is proved for a clique graph in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.1 A Markov Chain Lemma
Consider a Markov Chain on a line graph of n nodes, namely s1, s2, ..., sn, where transition
does not happen beyond adjacent nodes. In this subsection we want to show that if at any
state si (1 < i < n), the Markov chain is more likely to go ‘backward’ to state si+1 than
to go ‘forward’ to state si−1, then starting from state si (where i ≥ 2), it takes exponential
time in expectation to hit state s1. While this is perhaps intuitive, we will need this result
to be in a particular form for the later reduction.
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Here are a couple of notations: Let pi,j (i, j ∈ [n]) be the transition probability from
node i to j, by construction pi,j = 0 if |i − j| > 1. Simplify notation by writing pi = pi,i−1
and qi = pi,i+1, which are the ‘forward’ and ’backward’ transition probability, respectively.
Define hi to be the expected number of rounds for the process to hit state s1 for the first
time, given that it starts from state si. Let
γmax = max
i∈{2,3,...,n−1}
qi
pi
γmin = min
i∈{2,3,...,n−1}
qi
pi
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If γmin ≥ 1 + ε for some constant ε > 0, then hi (i ≥ 2) is exponential in n.
Proof. We first claim that hi − hi−1 >
γn−imin
pn
. To prove this claim, note hi satisfies the
following linear system
hi =

0 (i = 0)
1 + pihi−1 + qihi+1 + (1− pi − qi)hi (2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
1 + pnhn−1 + (1− pn)hn (i = n)
It is clear hj−hj−1 > 0 for all j > 1 as a process starting from state sj has to hit sj−1 before
hitting s1. Let hj − hj−1 = λj, combining it with hj−1 = 1 + pj−1hj−2 + qj−1hj + (1− pj−1−
qj−1)hj−1 gives hj−1−hj−2 =
1 + qj−1λj
pj−1
, which in turn implies λj−1 >
(
qj−1
pj−1
)
λj > γminλj.
Repeating this inductively gives λi > γ
n−i
minλn. Since λn =
1
pn
, this proves the claim.
Immediately following from this claim, we have h2 = h2 − h1 >
γn−2min
pn
≥ (1 + ε)n−2 if
γmin ≥ 1 + ε. Since hi > h2 whenever i > 2, this completes the proof.
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2.4.2 Exponential Time Convergence on a Line
Our goal in this subsection is to prove Theorem 3. To this end, first consider the biased
voter model on the following 3-regular line graph.
A Line Graph. G is a line graph of 2n nodes, where the left half prefers blue and the right
half prefers red. The leftmost and rightmost node each has two self-loops and all the other
nodes have one self-loop.
We prove two lemmas (Lemma 2 and 3) about this particular setting, as a preparation
for the proof of the main theorem.
Lemma 2. For any biased voter model protocol (I,F), given that I results in an initializa-
tion where all nodes initialized to blue are to the left of all nodes initialized to red, it takes
exponential time in expectation to reach a consensus on the line.
Proof. We prove this by reducing this stochastic process to the Markov process described in
Section A.1. First observe that since we start with a coloring where all blues are to the left
of all reds, this will hold as an invariant throughout the evolution of the whole process and
the only way for the coloring to evolve is for the blue node adjacent to a red neighbor to
convert to red, or for its red neighbor to convert to blue.
Therefore, we can always describe the state by a pair of integers (b, 2n − b), where b is
the number of blue-colored nodes. Now if we lump two states, (b, 2n − b) and (2n − b, b),
into one, this model is exactly the Markov process (with n + 1 states) described in Section
A.1 with si = {(i, 2n− i), (2n− i, i)} for i = {0, 1, ..., n}.
And by definition of biased voter model and the way the Markov chain is constructed in
the above, we have pi ≤
1/3− ε
2n
and qi ≥
1/3 + θ
2n
(i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 1}) for some constant
ε > 0. Therefore, γmin ≥
1/3 + θ
1/3− ε
= 1+δ, for some constant δ > 0. Invoking Lemma 1 shows
that it takes exponential time to hit s0 starting from state si (where i ≥ 1). Therefore, it
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takes exponential time to reach a consensus given that one starts with a coloring where all
nodes initialized to blue are to the left of all nodes initialized to red.
Lemma 3. For any biased voter model protocol (I,F), if I initializes a node i to his preferred
opinion with positive probability, then it takes exponential time in expectation to reach a
consensus on the line.
Proof. Note I is independent of G, therefore whenever it initializes with positive probability,
the probability is independent of n. In particular, the probability that I initializes the
leftmost node to blue and the rightmost node to red is not exponentially small in n. Therefore
we are through if we can show that given the leftmost node is initialized to blue and the
rightmost to red, it takes exponential time to reach a consensus.
Lemma 2 does not differentiate between a b-consensus and a r-consensus. If we concern
ourselves only with the outcome of, say a b-consensus, it can be shown that it still takes
exponential time to reach given that we start from the same initialization described in
Lemma 2 (i.e. all blues are to the right of all reds). We prove this by first observing that,
conditioning on that a b-consensus is reached, the time taken is distributed exactly the same
as in the modified stochastic process on the same 2n-node line graph, with the only difference
being making the leftmost node extremely biased towards blue so that it always votes for blue
regardless of his neighbor’s opinion. Therefore we only need to prove it takes exponential
time for this modified process to reach a consensus (which can only be a blue one), and this
follows from Lemma 2.
Of course by a similar argument we can show that starting from an initialization where
all blues are to the left of all reds, it takes exponential time to reach a r-consensus.
Now consider the initialization where the leftmost node is blue and rightmost node is red
and call this the case of interest. Compare it with the initialization where the leftmost node
is blue and all the other n−1 nodes are red, the r-consensus time of this case is clearly upper
bounded by that of the case of interest. By the above discussion, it takes exponential time to
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reach a r-consensus even when we start with only the leftmost node blue; therefore, it takes
exponential time to reach a r-consensus for the case of interest. By the same argument, it
also takes exponential time to reach a b-consensus for the case of interest. In sum this allows
us to conclude that it takes exponential time to reach a consensus given that I initializes
the leftmost node to blue and the rightmost to red.
We are now ready to give a proof for Theorem 3.
Proof. (of Theorem 3) In Lemma 3, we have already shown that any biased voter model
protocol (I,F) fails to solve the NBVP (taking exponential time to converge) if we restrict
I to the kind of initialization functions that initializes a node to its preferred opinion with
positive probability. It is easy to see that (I,F) also fails for any I that does the opposite,
in which case I initializes a node to his not-preferred opinion with probability 1: Simply
construct a graph consists solely of nodes that prefer blue, and I initializes it to a r-consensus.
Therefore, we conclude that any biased voter model protocol (I,F) fails to solve the NBVP.
Note since the line graph we construct above is 3-regular, we have actually shown a
stronger version of Theorem 3: Even if we allow both I and F to depend on di, no protocol
(I,F) can solve the NBVP. We also note that a similar exponential convergence result can
be shown for clique in certain settings.
2.4.3 Exponential Time Convergence on a Clique
In this section, we show that it takes exponential time for any multiplicative biased voter
model protocol to converge on a clique in the following setting.
A Clique. G is a clique of 2n nodes, of which n prefer blue, n prefer red and each node has
a self-loop. Denote by si,j (i, j ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}) the state where out of the n (resp. n) nodes
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who prefer blue (resp. red), i (resp. j) of them are colored blue and n − i (resp. n − j) of
them are colored red. Denote by f =
i+ j
2n
the blue fraction.
We state our result in Theorem 4, which says that starting from an initialization with f
bounded away from both 0 and 1, in expectation it takes exponential time for any biased
voter model protocol to reach a consensus on G.
Theorem 4. For any multiplicative biased voter model protocol (I,F) where all nodes share
the same strength of bias w ≥ 1
2
+ ε (i.e. for any i ∈ V , if i prefers α ∈ {b, r}, then
wi(α) = w), it takes exponential time in expectation to reach either a blue-consensus or a
red-consensus starting from any state with blue fraction f in the interval [δ, 1− δ], for some
constant δ > 0.
Proof. To prove this, we show any uniformly-biased multiplicative protocol (I,F) on a clique
can be viewed as a biased voter model protocol (I ′,F ′) on the line graph described in Sec.
2.4.2 (i.e. a line graph of 2n nodes where left half prefers blue and right half prefers red),
therefore invoking Lemma 2 and 3 establishes the result.
First observe that the stochastic process on the clique can be reduced to a Markov chain
on a (n + 1)× (n + 1) 2-dimensional grid, where a node (i, j) corresponds to state si,j. We
arrange the grid so that the northwest node corresponds to s0,0 and the southeast node
corresponds to sn,n. Denote by pn(i, j) the probability of a transition from state si,j to state
si−1,j (i.e. going north), and define ps, pw and pe analogously. We have
pn(i, j) =
(1− f)(1− w)
fw + (1− f)(1− w)
· fb
ps(i, j) =
fw
fw + (1− f)(1− w)
·
(
1
2
− fb
)
pw(i, j) =
(1− f)w
f(1− w) + (1− f)w
· fr
pe(i, j) =
f(1− w)
f(1− w) + (1− f)w
·
(
1
2
− fr
)
26
where fb =
i
2n
, fr =
j
2n
and f = fb + fr. Now define new state s
′
k = {si,j | i + j = k},
k ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2n}. This reduces the Markov chain on the clique to the Markov chain on the
line. Now to establish our above claim that the Markov chain on the clique can be viewed
as a biased voter model protocol on the line, all that we need to show are the following:
1. The transition probability from s′k to s
′
k−1 is greater than the transition probabil-
ity from s′k to s
′
k+1 by at least a constant gap when f is bounded away from 1 and
1
2
, i.e. pn(i, j) + pw(i, j) − ps(i, j) − pe(i, j) ≥ ζ for some constant ζ > 0 whenever
1− δ ≥ f ≥ 1
2
+ δ for some constant δ > 0.
2. The transition probability from s′k to s
′
k−1 is less than the transition probability from
s′k to s
′
k+1 by at least a constant gap when f bounded away from 0 and
1
2
, i.e. pn(i, j)+
pw(i, j) − ps(i, j) − pe(i, j) ≤ ζ for some constant ζ > 0 whenever δ ≤ f ≤
1
2
− δ for
some constant δ > 0.
We give proof for the first part in the following, and the proof of the second part is
essentially the same.
pn(i, j) + pw(i, j)− ps(i, j)− pe(i, j)
= fb
[
(1− f)(1− w)
(1− f)(1− w) + fw
+
fw
fw + (1− f)(1− w)
]
+fr
[
(1− f)w
f(1− w) + (1− f)w
+
f(1− w)
f(1− w) + (1− f)w
]
−1
2
[
fw
fw + (1− f)(1− w)
− f(1− w)
f(1− w) + (1− f)w
]
= f − 1
2
[
fw
fw + (1− f)(1− w)
− f(1− w)
f(1− w) + (1− f)w
]
=
(
f − 1
2
)[
1− w(1− w)
f 2w(1− w) + f(1− f)(1− w)2 + f(1− f)w2 + (1− f)2w(1− w)
]
=
(
f − 1
2
)
f(1− f)(4w2 − 4w + 1)
≥ 4ε2δ2(1− δ)
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where the last inequality follows form the face that w ≥ 1
2
+ ε, and
1
2
+ δ ≤ f ≤ 1− δ.
2.5 A Protocol for NBVP
Previous discussions establish the limit of the classic voter model protocol and its natural
extension to the biased voter model when it comes to solving NBVP. We are thus interested
in the question: What are the (ideally minimal) extensions to the biased voter model needed
to obtain a simple, efficient and local protocol for solving the NBVP?
In this section, we give one answer to this question by providing a provable solution to
the NBVP that employs the following extensions:
1. Make the degree of G , d(G) = maxi∈V di, an input to F . This allows each node to
increase its influence by adding d(G)− di self-loops.3
2. Allowing initialization and evolution of a node’s opinion be dependent on its degree in
G;
3. Allowing multiple identical copies of the protocol to be run in G and having each node
vote for the opinion converged to more frequently among the multiple runs. This can be
implemented by having a slightly more powerful schedule that after every n3+θ log(n)
steps, re-initializes each node.
We give the protocol in Algorithm 1. This protocol consists of T = poly(n) phases. In
each phase, each node simultaneously and independently initializes his opinion to either blue
or red with probabilities exactly proportional to his preferences of these two opinions. And
then the standard voter model protocol is run on the augmented d(G)-regular graph, where
each node has added d(G)− di extra self-loops. The reason for adding self-loops is to allow
3We note that in a strategic or game-theoretic setting, a node, among other deviations that he can make,
might of course choose to add more self-loops than this to further increase its influence. We examine this
topic in Sec. 2.6
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Algorithm 1 A Simple and Local Voting Protocol
1: Each node i maintains an array Ri of size T
2: Each node i adds d(G)− di self-loops
3: for phase = 1 to T do
4: Each node i simultaneously and independently initializes its color to b or r with prob-
ability wi(b) and wi(r), respectively;
5: Run the (standard) voter model protocol for n3+θ log(n) rounds
6: Each node i records his last round opinion of this phase of the voter model process in
Ri[phase]
7: end for
8: // Each node now has his local ‘outcomes’ of all T phases
9: Each node i identify a majority between b and r in Ri; breaking ties arbitrarily
10: Each node i vote for this majority identified as his final vote
individuals of otherwise different degrees to have equal degree, and thus ‘influence’, in the
voter model protocol. At the end of each phase, the standard voter model protocol is run for
n3+θ log(n) rounds and each node records his opinion in the last round as the ‘outcome’ of
this phase. After T phases, each node identifies the majority between blue and red among
the n outcomes; he then vote for this majority as his final vote.
We now proceed to prove that Algorithm 1 indeed solves the NBVP.
Lemma 4. Each of the T phases of Algorithm 1 leads to a blue-consensus (resp. red-
consensus) with probability that differs from
∑
i∈V wi(b)
n
(
resp.
∑
i∈V wi(r)
n
)
by O(1/2n
θ
).
Proof. We give proof for the case of a blue-consensus, and the proof for red-consensus follows
a similar argument.
Denote by p(B) the probability that B ⊆ V is the set of nodes initialized to blue, and
p(b | B) the probability that there is a blue-consensus after a single phase of Algorithm 1
given that B is the set of nodes initialized to blue. So
Pb =
∑
B∈2V
p(B)p(b | B)
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is the probability that a single phase of Algorithm 1 results in a b-consensus. By Theorem
2 we have |p(b | B)− π(B)| = O(1/2nθ), or p(b | B) = π(B)±O(1/2nθ), therefore
Pb =
∑
B∈2V
p(B)(π(B)±O(1/2nθ))
=
∑
B∈2V
p(B)π(B)±O(1/2nθ)
∑
B∈2V
p(B)
=
∑
B∈2V
p(B)π(B)±O(1/2nθ)
=
∑
B∈2V
p(B)|B|d(G)
nd(G)
±O(1/2nθ)
=
∑
i∈V wi(b)
n
±O(1/2nθ)
Therefore, we conclude that
∣∣∣∣Pb − ∑i∈V wi(b)n
∣∣∣∣ = O(1/2nθ) is exponentially small in n.
Recall our goal is to let V converge to the collectively preferred consensus. And by defi-
nition of the NBVP one opinion is significantly preferred than the other, i.e. |
∑
i∈V wi(b)−∑
i∈V wi(r)| ≥ ε for some possitive constant ε; this assumption turns out to be sufficient for
Algorithm 1 to achieve this goal if we set T = n2+τ for any constant τ > 0. We prove this
in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Setting T = n2+τ (for any constant τ > 0) in Algorithm 1 solves the NBVP.
Specifically, Algorithm 1 let V converge to the collectively preferred consensus with probability
1−O(cnτ ) (for some constant c ∈ (0, 1)) and it runs in O(n5+θ+τ log(n)) time.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume blue is the collectively preferred color. By
Lemma 4 we have Pb ≥
∑
i∈V wi(b)
n
−O(1/2nθ) and Pr ≤
∑
i∈V wi(r)
n
+O(1/2n
θ
). Therefore
the gap between Pb and Pr is at least
ε
n
−O(1/2nθ), so there exists a positive constant δ < ε
such that the gap between Pb and Pr is at least
δ
n
whenever n is sufficiently large.
Let Tb and Tr be the number of b-consensuses and r-consensuses among the T trials,
the bad event happens when Tb ≤ Tr. For this bad event to happen, the event Tb <
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(
Pb −
1
3
· δ
n
)
T has to happen. We now use Chernoff-Hoeffding bound (see Appendix A.2
for details) to show that when T = O(n2+τ ), this happens with probability exponentially
small in n.
P
(
Tb < (Pb −
δ
3n
)T
)
= P
(
Tb < TPb −
δ
3n
T
)
= P
(
Tb − E(Tb) < −
δ
3n
T
)
≤ e−2T (δ/3n)2
Therefore, setting T = n2+τ makes P
(
Tb < (Pb − δ3n)T
)
= O(cn
τ
) for some constant c ∈
(0, 1). Since P (Tb ≤ Tr) < P
(
Tb < (Pb − δ3n)T
)
, we have shown that Algorithm 1 converge
to blue with probability 1 − O(cnτ ). Also it is obvious to see that the running time is
O(n5+θ+τ log(n)). This completes the proof.
We note that the above analysis in fact suggests that the running time of Algorithm 1
can be expressed as a product of the mixing time of the voter model protocol on G and
n2+τ , so that on graphs where random walk mixes faster (e.g. expanders), Algorithm 1 has
a running time better than O(n5+θ+τ log(n)).
Before closing this section, we note that there is an alternative protocol that is a natural
variant of Algorithm 1. In this variant, we do not need to let each node know d(G), instead
we introduce a third opinion u that we call undecided.4 We then modify Algorithm 1 so
that at the beginning of each of the T phases, each node initializes its opinion to blue, red,
and undecided with probability
wi(b)
d(i)
,
wi(r)
d(i)
, and
d(i)− 1
d(i)
, respectively. These initialization
probabilities are properly chosen so that the probability of reaching an α-consensus (α ∈
{b, r}) is proportional to
∑
i∈V wi(α). After the initialization phase, the alternative protocol
does the same thing as Algorithm 1 by running the classic voter model protocol for n3+θ log(n)
rounds. And using essentially the same analysis it can be shown that this alternative protocol
also solves the NBVP in polynomial time.
4It is interesting to note that this extension of giving nodes the ability to temporarily declare oneself
undecided has obvious analogue in many real political processes. And the same can be said about the
extension of allowing multiple runs in an election.
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2.6 An ε-Nash Protocol for the Networked Biased Vot-
ing Game
Our protocol for solving NBVP assumes that each individual will actually follow the protocol
honestly. However in a strategic setting, an individual may have incentives to deviate from
the prescribed protocol. For example, a node i who prefers blue may deviate from Algorithm
1 in a way that increases the chance of reaching a blue-consensus, even when this consensus
is not collectively preferred.
This naturally leads us to consider the Networked Biased Voting Game (NBVG), which
is an extension of NBVP to the strategic, or game theoretic, setting. In NBVG, a node with
preference (wi(b), wi(r)) receives payoff wi(b) (resp., wi(r)) if the game results in an unani-
mous global blue-consensus (resp., red-consensus) and payoff 0 if no consensus is reached. A
solution to NBVG is a protocol that solves the NBVP (which must be simple and local and
in polynomial time converge to the collectively preferred consensus with high probability)
and at the same time constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the game. We note that NBVG may
also be viewed as a distributed, networked version of the classic “Battle of the Sexes” game,
or as a networked coordination game [68].
In the rest of this section, we show the existence of a protocol that is an ε-approximate
Nash equilibirum, or ε-Nash for short, of NBVG. This means although a node can deviate
unilaterally from this protocol and increases his expected payoff, the amount of this increase
is at most ε and we show ε is exponentially small in n and can be made arbitrarily small.
To this end, we need to make the following mild assumptions.
1. The removal of any node from G leaves the remaining graph connected. Formally, let
G−i be the graph induced by V \{i}, we assume G−i is connected for all i ∈ V .
2. The exclusion of any node does not change the collectively preferred consensus, and
moreover, it still leaves a significant (constant) gap between
∑
j∈V (G−i) wj(b) and
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∑
j∈V (G−i) wj(r).
3. Each node i is identified by a unique ID, ID(i), which is an integer in {1, 2, ..., n}.
Our ε-Nash protocol consists of n runs of the non-Nash protocol Algorithm 1, each on
a subgraph G−i. Each run of Algorithm 1 polls the majority opinion of V \{i}, which by
assumption is the same as that of V ; however by excluding i from participating, we prevent
him from any manipulation of this particular run of the non-Nash protocol. When all the
n runs of non-Nash is done, each node ends up with n− 1 ‘polls’ and with high probability
they should all point to the same collectively preferred consensus. In case it does not, it is
strong evidence that some run(s) of the non-Nash protocol had been manipulated and the
contingency plan is for each node to ignore all the polling results entirely and toss a (private)
fair coin to decide whether to vote for blue or red — and this turns out to be a sufficient
deterrent of unilateral deviation from the non-Nash protocol.
We note conceptually we are making yet another simple extension in the protocol’s ex-
pressiveness by allowing it to be run on a subgraph G−i. To implement this, it is important
for each node i to be uniquely identified by his neighbors so that they know when to ignore
i; and this is the reason we need assumption 3 listed above. We give this ε-Nash protocol in
Algorithm 2 and claim the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Algorithm 2 constitutes an ε-Nash equilibrium of the NBVG. Algorithm 2 runs
in O(n6+θ+τ log(n)) time and ε = O(ncn
τ
) for some constant c ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Suppose each node follows the protocol faithfully, by our assumption that the exclu-
sion of any node does not change the collectively preferred consensus, say blue, each of the
n runs of Algorithm 1 results in a b-consensus with probability 1 − O(cnτ ) by Theorem 5
(for some constant c ∈ (0, 1)). So by union bound the probability that all the n runs of
Algorithm 1 have all resulted in a b-consensus is at least 1 − O(ncnτ ). Therefore the final
votes result in the collectively preferred b-consensus with high probability.
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Algorithm 2 A Simple and Local Protocol that is ε-Nash
1: Each node i maintains an array Ei of size n− 1
2: for episode = 1 to n do
3: Let i be the node such that ID(i) = episode
4: Run Line 1 - 8 of Algorithm 1 on G−i
5: Each node j ∈ V \{i} records in Ej[episode] the majority between b and r he identifies
on Line 8 of (this run of) Algorithm 1
6: end for
7: // Each node has now participated in n− 1 runs of Algorithm 1
8: for all i ∈ V do
9: if both b and r are present in the n− 1 entries of Ei then
10: Tossing a private fair coin to decide between b and r, and vote for it as i’s final vote
11: else
12: Vote for the only opinion present as i’s final vote
13: end if
14: end for
Now we examine why faithfully executing this protocol is an ε-Nash strategy for each
node, where ε = O(ncn
τ
). For a node i that prefers red (i.e. the opinion not collectively
preferred), assuming everyone else is following Algorithm 2, the expected payoff to i for doing
the same is at least his payoff in a b-consensus minus a number exponentially small in n,
i.e. O(ncn
τ
), because of the exponentially small probability that a b-consensus may not be
reached even if every node follows Algorithm 2 faithfully. Now we consider what happens if
it deviates. There are two stages during which i can deviate: the first or the second for-loop
in Algorithm 2. i’s effort during the first for-loop is obviously immaterial if none of the n−1
runs of Algorithm 1 is turned into a r-consensus, and in this case, with high probability all
the n runs of Algorithm 1 result in a b-consensus. Therefore, i will have no incentive to
deviate during the second for-loop because everyone else is going to vote for b.
Next consider the case where i successfully turns some of the global outcomes of Algorithm
1 into a r-consensus (i.e. all nodes identify r as the majority on Line 8 of Algorithm 1),
then with high probability (at least 1 − O(cnτ )) the n runs of Algorithm 1 result in both
r-consensus and b-consensus because the single run of it without i participating results in a
b-consensus with probability 1−O(cnτ ). In this case, at least n− 2 nodes out of V \{i} see
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both blue and red as outcomes from the n − 1 runs of Algorithm 1 they each participated
in and will vote for either b or r by tossing a private fair coin, which means the probability
of reaching a b-consensus or r-consensus among them, independent of whatever strategy i
adopts in the second for-loop, is
(
1
2
)n−2
. Therefore, no matter what strategy i adopts in the
second for-loop, his expected payoff is exponentially small and obviously worse than what
he would have gotten by not deviating. Therefore, we conclude that executing Algorithm 2
faithfully is actually a Nash strategy for i.
Now consider a node j who prefers a b-consensus. By the same discussion as above,
Algorithm 2 results in a b-consensus in the final voting with probability at least 1−O(ncnτ ),
therefore the expected payoff to j is at least his payoff in a b-consensus minus an exponentially
small number of O(ncn
τ
). Therefore by deviating j can only hope to improve his expected
payoff by O(ncn
τ
). And this allows us to conclude that each node following Algorithm 2
faithfully constitutes an ε-Nash equilibrium for the game, where ε = O(ncn
τ
). Also it is easy
to see that Algorithm 2 runs in O(n6+θ+τ log(n)) time. This completes the proof.
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Chapter 3
A Behavioral Study on Biased Voting
in Networks
3.1 Introduction
In recent years there has been much research on network based models in game theory, in both
the computer science and economics communities. Topics receiving considerable attention
include the effects of network topology on equilibrium properties [46, 50, 55, 49, 61], price
of anarchy analyses of selfish routing and other networking problems [80], game-theoretic
models of network formation (see [31] and citations therein), equilibrium computation in
networked settings (see [52, 77] and citations therein), and many others. This large and
growing literature has been almost exclusively theoretical, with few accompanying empirical
or behavioral studies [21, 36] examining the relevance of the mathematical models to actual
behavior.
In this chapter and the next, we report on two series of highly controlled human subject
experiments in networked biased voting and networked bargaining, respectively. We focus
on networked biased voting in this chapter, which is modelled exactly the same as the
theoretical problem of the same name considered in Chapter 2, and is similarly motivated by
distributed collective decision-making processes where balances have to be struck between
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Figure 3.1: Screenshot of the user interface for a typical experiment.
diverse individual preferences and a desire for collective unity.
In each experiment, 36 subjects each simultaneously sit at workstations and control the
state of a single vertex in a 36-vertex network whose connectivity structure is determined
exogenously and is unknown to the subjects. The state of a subject’s vertex is simply one
of 2 colors (red or blue), and can be asynchronously updated as often as desired during the
1-min experiment. Subjects are able to view the current color choices of their immediate
neighbors in the network at all times but otherwise have no global information on the current
state of the network (aside from a crude and relatively uninformative “progress bar”; see Fig.
3.1. No communication between subjects outside the experimental platform is permitted.
In addition, each subject is given a financial incentive that varies across the network, and
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specifies both individual preferences and the demand for collective unity. For instance, one
player might be paid $1.25 for blue consensus and $0.75 for red consensus, whereas another
might be paid $0.50 for blue consensus and $1.50 for red consensus, thus creating distinct and
competing preferences across individuals. However, payments for an experiment are made
only if (red or blue) global unanimity is reached, so subjects must balance their preference
for higher payoffs with their desire for any payoff at all. A screenshot for a particular subject
in a typical experiment is shown in Fig. 3.1.
We note that our experiments may also be viewed as a distributed, networked version
of the classic “Battle of the Sexes” game, or as a networked coordination game [68]. Com-
pared with the traditional analyses of these games, we are particularly interested in the
effects arising as a result of the interactions of varying network structure and varying incen-
tive schemes. We note that although our experimental framework deliberately omits global
“broadcast” mechanisms for consensus (other than the aforementioned progress bar) that
are common in many public electoral processes – such as media polls, “mainstream” media
reports and analyses – many other real-world sources of both small and large-scale influence
can be modeled via network structure. For instance, individuals whose opinion reaches an
inordinately large number of others (such as might be expected of some political bloggers)
can be modeled by high-degree vertices. Cohesive or close-knit groups of like-minded indi-
viduals can be modeled by subsets of vertices with similar incentives and dense connectivity.
Our experiments deliberately introduce such structures and others. We also remark that
our demand for complete unanimity before any payoffs are made is an abstraction of most
real decision-making and voting processes, where a sufficiently strong consensus is typically
enough to yield the benefits of unity. Although we expect most of our findings would be
robust to such weakening, we leave its investigation to future research.
Our methodology and experiments mix recent lines of thought from algorithmic game
theory, behavioral economics and social network theory, and are among the first and largest
behavioral experiments on network effects in collective decision making to date. We adopt
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many of the practices of behavioral game theory [17], which has tended to focus on two-
player or small-population games rather than larger networked settings. The experiments
described here are part of an extensive and continuing series that have been conducted at
the University of Pennsylvania since 2005, in which collective problem-solving from only
local interactions in a network has been studied on a wide range of tasks, including graph
coloring [56], trading of virtual goods [48], and several other problems. An overarching goal
of this line of research is to establish the ways in which network structure and task type and
difficulty interact to influence individual and collective behavior and performance.
Our results include a detailed examination of how network structure and incentives influ-
ence collective and individual outcome, as well as how individual behavior, or style of play,
can be related to his performance. The networks imposed are drawn from models common
in social network theory, including preferential attachment graphs, random (Erdös-Rényi)
networks, and some carefully designed structures. Among our most striking findings are the
following:
• We find that there are well-studied network topologies in which the minority preference
consistently wins globally;
• We find that the presence of “extremist” individuals, or the awareness of opposing
incentives, reliably improve collective performance;
• We find that certain behavioral characteristics of individual subjects, such as “stub-
bornness”, are strongly correlated with earnings.
All of the above results and almost all others reported in this chapter are highly statis-
tically significant.
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3.2 System and Experiment Methodology
3.2.1 System Description
Experiments were conducted using a distributed networked software system we have designed
and built over the past several years for performing a series of behavioral network experiments
on different games. This section briefly describes the user’s view of that system in our biased
voting experiments.
Fig. 3.1 shows a screenshot of the user interface for a typical experiment. Each subject
sees only a local (“ego network”) view of the global 36-vertex network, showing their own
vertex at the center and their immediate neighbors surrounding. Edges between connected
neighbors are also shown, as are integers denoting how many unseen neighbors each neighbor
has. Vertex colors are the current color choices of the corresponding subjects, which can
be changed at any time using the buttons at the bottom. The subject’s payoffs for the
experiment are shown (in this case $0.75 for global red consensus, $1.25 for blue), and
simple bars show the elapsed time in the experiment and the “game progress”, a simple
global quantity measuring the fraction of edges in the network with the same color on each
end. This progress bar is primarily intended to make subjects aware that there is activity
elsewhere in the network to promote attention, and is uninformative regarding the current
majority choice.
The system logs fine-grained temporal data on the exact sequence of events in each
experiment. This log contains every color-change event, along with vertex or subject number,
the color selected, and a time stamp with 1 millisecond resolution. We also administer an
exit questionnaires to each subject.
3.2.2 Human Subject Methodology
We give in this section some further details of our experimental and human subject method-
ologies. The human subject methodology that we used was approved by Penn’s Institutional
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Review Board process.
This chapter describes one session of experiments conducted in May 2008. The session
consisted of 81 individual networked biased voting experiments, each lasted up to 1 minute in
time. The session was held in a laboratory containing 38 workstations, of which 36 are used
in the actual experiments with the other 2 as spare ones. This determined the number of
subjects for each experiment as 36, who were recruited from a Penn undergraduate computer
science class on a topic related to the experiments.
Each of the 81 experiments had a fixed network and incentive structure, and the system
assigned each of the 36 subjects randomly to one of the 36 network positions at the start of
each experiment, thus assuring there was no systematic bias in the position of subjects in
the networks. To prevent the establishment of social conventions that could trivialize the
experiments (such as all subjects playing red for the remainder of the session following a
successful global consensus to red), the system used a local randomization scheme on the
colors, which might make what appeared red to one player appear blue to another.
Prior to the main session of experiments, subjects attended a compulsory briefing session
in which they were instructed about the networked biased voting problem, and the work-
ing of the system. We also ran a preliminary set of experiments to ensure the subjects’
understanding of the game and the working of the software system.
Before the experiments, physical partitions were set up to prevent subjects from viewing
other subjects or their screens. The whole session of experiments were carefully proctored
to ensure that the only kind of communication that takes place between the subjects is
through the experimental software platform. Each experiment ended either after 1 minute
or when the 36 subjects successfully reached a unanimous consensus, whichever came first.
At this point, the session proceeded to the next voting experiment. The whole session lasted
between 2 and 3 hours.
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Figure 3.2: Visualization of network and incentive structures.
3.2.3 Experiment Design
There are two main design variables underlying our experiments: the connectivity structure
of the underlying network and the financial incentives and their placement in the network.
In each experiment, the network structure and the incentives were chosen in a coordinated
fashion to examine specific scenarios or hypotheses. We now describe these choices and
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hypotheses in greater detail.
The 81 experiments fell into 2 broad categories that we call the Cohesion experiments
(54 experiments) and the Minority Power experiments (27 experiments), named for the
phenomena they were designed to investigate. All of the networks used had 36 vertices and
nearly identical edge counts (101 ± 1), thus fixing edge density; only the arrangement of
connectivity varied, and not the amount.
In the Cohesion experiments (named in part for a particular measure of inter- and intra-
group connectivity [71]), vertices were divided into 2 groups of 18. Vertices in one group
(the “red” group) were given incentives paying more for a red global consensus, whereas
vertices in the other group (the “blue” group) were given incentives paying more for a blue
global consensus. The relative strengths of these incentives were varied, as were the amount
and nature of the connectivity within and between the two groups. In particular, we varied
whether the typical vertex had more or fewer inter-group than intra-group edges, thus con-
trolling whether local neighborhoods were comprised primarily of individuals with aligned
incentives (high cohesion), competing incentives (low cohesion), or approximately balanced
incentives. We also varied the nature of this connectivity; half of the Cohesion experiments
used networks whose edges were generated (subject to the inter/intra group constraints) by
a random or Erdös-Rényi process [13] (in which all edges are chosen randomly and indepen-
dently with some fixed probability), the other half by the preferential attachment process
[7] (which is known to generate the oft-observed power law distribution of connectivity).
These two network formation models are well-studied and together provide significant vari-
ation over a number of common structural properties, including network diameter, degree
distribution, and clustering.
The overarching goal of the Cohesion experiments was to systematically investigate how
collective and individual performance and behavior varied with neighborhood diversity and
the strength of preferences. Although it is perhaps most natural to hypothesize that increased
inter-group connectivity should improve collective performance – this would be consistent
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with several mathematical network theories and metrics, including the aforementioned cohe-
sion, and notions of expansion from the graph theory literature [13] – the degree of improve-
ment, and how it might be influenced by the detailed structure (Erdös-Rényi vs. preferential
attachment), the variability of individual human behavior, and so on, are difficult to predict.
In the Minority Power experiments, all networks were generated via preferential attach-
ment [7]. A minority of the vertices with the highest degrees (number of neighbors) were then
assigned incentives preferring red global consensus to blue, whereas the remaining majority
were assigned incentives preferring blue global consensus. The size of the chosen minority
was varied (6, 9, or 14), as were the relative strengths of preferences.
For each of the different network structures in the Cohesion and Minority Power families,
we ran experiments in which there were “strong symmetric”, “weak symmetric”, and “asym-
metric” incentive structures. By “symmetric” we mean that the incentives of those players
preferring blue and those preferring red were symmetrically opposed (such as $0.75/$1.25
for consensus to red/blue vs. $1.25/ $0.75); by “weak” and “strong” we refer to the relative
magnitudes of the preferred and non-preferred payments ($1.25 to $0.75 for weak, $1.50 to
$0.50 for strong). In the asymmetric incentives experiments, the group preferring one color
would be given strong incentives, whereas groups preferring the other color would be given
weak incentives. We thus imposed scenarios in which 2 opposing groups “cared” equally but
mildly about the global outcome, equally and strongly, or in which one group cared more
than the other.
Fig. 3.2 shows a visualization of the network and incentive structures in our design. For
each of the 9 network and incentive structures there is a diagram consisting of 36 rows of
colored dots. Each row corresponds to a single subject or vertex in the network, and the dots
in that row represent that subject and his or her network neighbors. The color of the central
dot indicates the preferred (higher payoff) color for the corresponding subject, according to
the incentives. The dots to the left of center indicate the number of neighboring subjects with
the same preference; the dots to the right indicate the number with the opposite preference.
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Vertices are ordered within groups by their overall degree.
The top three designs are Cohesion experiments with Erdös-Rényi connectivity in which
there is more intra- than inter-group connectivity between the two groups (specifically a 1:2
inter:intra ratio) in the design on the left; balanced connectivity (1:1 ratio) in the design on
the center; and more inter- than intra-group connectivity (2:1 inter:intra ratio) in the design
on the right. This is demonstrated by the migration of dots from left of center to right of
center as we move from column 1 to 2 to 3.
The middle row corresponds to Cohesion experiments with preferential attachment con-
nectivity in the same inter:intra ratios as the coER row above. Comparison with the first
row reveals clear differences in the overall degree distributions, because the variance in the
total number of neighbors of subjects is much higher for preferential attachment and those
diagrams reveal the presence of subjects with very large numbers of neighbors.
The bottom row corresponds to Minority Power experiments, where again we see the
heavy-tailed degree distributions typical of preferential attachment but in which now the
blue-preferring vertices are selected to be a minority of varying sizes (14, 9, and 6) with the
highest degrees. Each of these 9 network structures was combined with payoff amounts that
were weak symmetric, strong symmetric and asymmetric, yielding 27 distinct scenarios that
were each executed in 3 trials, for a total of 81 experiments.
The overarching goal of the Minority Power experiments was to systematically investigate
the influence that a small but well connected set of individuals could have on collective
decision making – in particular, to investigate whether such a group could reliably cause
their preferred outcome to hold globally and unanimously.
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Figure 3.3: Visualization of the collective dynamics for all 81 experiments.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Collective Behavior
Overall the subject population exhibited fairly strong collective performance. Of the 81 ex-
periments, 55 ended in global consensus within 1 min (resulting in some payoff to all partic-
ipants), with the mean completion time of the successful experiments being 43.9 s (standard
deviation 9.6 s). We now proceed to describe more specific findings quantifying the impact of
network structure, incentive schemes, and individual behavior. Network structure influenced
collective performance in a variety of notable ways. The Cohesion experiments were consid-
erably harder for the subjects than the Minority Power experiments; only 31 of 54 of the
former were solved compared with 24 of 27 of the latter (difference significant at P < 0.001).
Furthermore, in all 24 of the successfully completed Minority Power experiments, the global
consensus reached was in fact the preferred color of the well-connected minority. Together
these results suggest that not only can an influentially positioned minority group reliably
override the majority preference, but that such a group can in fact facilitate global unity.
Within the Cohesion experiments, generating connectivity according to preferential attach-
ment (20/27 solved) yielded better collective performance than generating it via Erdös-Rényi
(11/27 solved; difference significant at P≈ 0.013). When combined with the high success rate
of the preferential attachment Minority Power experiments (the difference between the 44/54
solved instances of all preferential attachment networks and the 11/27 solved Erdös-Rényi
networks is significant at P < 0.001), this finding indicates that, for this class of consensus
problems, preferential attachment connectivity may generally be easier for subjects than
Erdös-Rényi connectivity, an interesting contrast to problems of social differentiation such
as graph coloring [56], where preferential attachment networks appear to create behavioral
difficulties. Independent of the method for generating connectivity, Cohesion performance
improved systematically as within-group connectivity was replaced by between-group con-
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nectivity, with the strongest performance coming from Cohesion networks in which most
subjects might have a preferred color different from those of a majority of their neighbors.
Across all Cohesion experiments, the success rate on the networks with the highest level of
inter-group connectivity (14/18 solved) and the success rate when connectivity was either
mainly intra-group or balanced (17/36 solved) are significantly different (P < 0.03). Thus,
increased awareness of the presence of opposing preferences improves social welfare. In terms
of behavioral collective dynamics, it appears that this awareness leads to early “experimen-
tation” with subjects’ non-preferred colors, resulting in more rapid mixing of the population
choices. Across all network structures, asymmetric incentives yielded the strongest collec-
tive performance (the overall asymmetric success rate of 22/27 differs from the combined
weak/strong symmetric success rate of 33/54 at P < 0.05), and, indeed, the extremist’s
preferences were dominant, determining the consensus outcome in 18 of the 22 successful
asymmetric experiments. Strong symmetric incentives (14/27 successes) yielded worse per-
formance than weak symmetric ones (19/27 successes). Thus, it appears most beneficial to
have extremists present in a relatively indifferent population, and most harmful to have 2
opposing extremist groups.
The results on collective behavior described so far have focused on the final outcomes of
experiments. The collective dynamics within individual experiments is also revealing, and
shows notable effects of network structure.
In Fig. 3.3 we provide visualizations of the collective dynamics in each of the 81 experi-
ments, grouped by network structure and incentive scheme. For each network and incentive
structure there is a set of axes with 3 plots corresponding to the three trials of those struc-
tures. Each plot shows the number of players choosing the eventual collective consensus
or majority color minus the number of players choosing the opposite color (y axis) at each
moment of time in the experiment (x axis). All plots start at 0 before any color choices
have been made;plots reaching a value of 36 within 60 s are those that succeeded in reaching
unanimous consensus. Negative values indicate moments where the current majority color
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is the opposite of its eventual value. Plots are grouped by network structure first (Cohesion
experiments with Erdös-Rényi connectivity in A; Cohesion experiments with preferential
attachment connectivity in B; Minority Power experiments in C), and then labelled with
details on the network and incentive structure. Within the Cohesion experiments, inter-
group connectivity increases from left to right; within the Minority Power experiments, the
minority size is decreasing from left to right. Several distinctive effects of network structure
on the dynamics can be observed. Many Cohesion experiments spend a significant period
“wandering” far from the eventual consensus solution. In contrast, Minority Power exper-
iments invariably experience an initial rush into negative territory as the majority select
their preferred color, but are then quickly influenced by the well-connected minority. Several
instances of rather sudden convergence to the final color can also be seen, even after long
periods of near consensus to the opposite color (e.g., blue plot in lower left corner axes of B
at about 50 s). Fig. 3.4 below provides a visual summary of some of the qualitative effects
of network structure on these dynamics.
Notable features include a ritual initial flurry of activity away from the minority prefer-
ence in the Minority Power experiments, followed by an inevitable assertion of the minority
influence over the population. There are also many instances in which a significant frac-
tion of the experiment is spent quite far away from the eventual consensus choice, including
near-total reversals of the collectively chosen color; see Fig. 3.3 and for further details.
Although these visualizations of the dynamics are rich in detail, it is difficult to extract
meaningful structural effects from them. In Fig. 3.4 we thus show the results of fitting
simple 2-segment random walk models to the experimental dynamics within each family of
experiments (fixed network and incentive structure).
For each of the 81 individual experimental plots in Fig. 3.3, we fit a 2-segment random
walk model to the data – one segment for the first 20 s of the experiment, and one for the
remainder of the experiment (similar findings result from different cut points between the
two segments). Within each segment, we simply compute the fraction p of “upwards” moves
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Figure 3.4: Visualization of biased random-walk model fits to the dynamics of Fig. 3.3.
(the number of moves toward the eventual majority color, divided by the total number of
moves within the segment). This can be interpreted as modeling the collective dynamics by
a random walk with probabilities p and 1−p of upwards and downward moves, respectively;
we refer to p as the bias of the model. Permitting independent bias values in the two
segments allows us to separately model the dynamics in the early and later portions of
each experiment. This yields a 2-parameter model for each of the 81 plots. Above we
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show the result of averaging over all incentive schemes and all repeated trials within the
9 families of network structures (Cohesion with Erdös-Rényi connectivity and 3 settings of
inter- vs. intra-group connectivity; Cohesion with preferential attachment connectivity in
3 inter- vs. intra- settings; and Minority Power with 3 different minority group sizes). For
each of these 9 families, we plot a point showing the average bias in the two segments, along
with a shaded rectangle delimiting the standard deviation in both bias parameters for that
family. The dashed lines show p = 0.5, where the model is unbiased (equal upward and
downward probability). Several qualitative effects of network structure are apparent. For
instance, Cohesion experiments tend to begin slowly (bias only slightly larger than 0.5), but
preferential attachment connectivity leads to more rapid convergence in the later portion
than does Erdös-Rényi connectivity. Increasing inter-group connectivity speeds the later
dynamics regardless of the connectivity type. Minority Power experiments tend to conclude
rapidly, but their early dynamics are strongly dependent on the minority size, with smaller
minorities slowing the early progress toward the eventual majority choice. When the minority
size is only 6, the first 20 seconds typically have a downward drift (bias p < 0.5).
These models clearly show the effects of structure on collective dynamics: In terms of
the rate of approach to the eventually favored color, Cohesion experiments with Erdös-Rényi
connectivity tend to both begin and end slowly, whereas those with preferential attachment
connectivity begin slowly but end more rapidly. Higher inter-group connectivity consistently
increased late-game speed toward consensus. The Minority Power dynamics ended relatively
fast, but early speed was heavily influenced by the size of their minorities.
3.3.2 Individual Behavior
It is natural to investigate the extent to which different human subjects exhibited distinct
strategies or styles of play across the experimental session, and the degree to which such
stylistic differences did or did not influence individual earnings. For any measure M of
individual subject behavior within an experiment (such as the number of color changes
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Figure 3.5: Illustration of the “random observer” method for detecting meaningful variation
in subject behavior.
made by the subject), we can compute the 36 average values for M obtained by taking
the 81-game average for each subject, and compare these to the distribution of “random
observer” averages, obtained by picking a random subject to observe in each experiment,
and averaging the resulting 81 M values. Because subjects were in fact randomly assigned
their network positions and incentives at the start of each experiment, if the variance of
the 36 actual subject averages significantly exceeds that of the random observer distribution
(according to a standard variance test), we can conclude that subjects exhibited meaningful
(greater than chance) variation on measure M .
Fig. 3.5 is an illustration of the “random observer” method for detecting meaningful
variation in subject behavior. The figure on the left shows in blue empirical cumulative dis-
tribution function (CDF) of total player wealth, in which wealth (x axis) is plotted against
the fraction of the 36 subjects earning at least that amount (y axis). It is very well-modeled
by the theoretical expected CDF generated by choosing a random player’s wealth indepen-
dently in each experiment (which is shown in orange), so we may conclude that the variation
in player wealth is explained by the random assignments to network position. In contrast,
the CDFs of the number of color changes taken by each player in the first several seconds
(the middle figure) and the total amount of “stubborn” time (the right figure) are poorly
modeled by the random observer CDF, showing considerably greater variance in both cases.
We note that it is particularly noteworthy that when the measure is wealth, subjects
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did not exhibit meaningful variation – thus the disparity in average or total wealth across
the session (which ranged from $46.50 total earnings to $58.75, with a mean of $52.76
and standard deviation of $2.46) is already well-explained by the random assignment of
subjects to positions. However, this finding in no way precludes the possibility that subjects
still display distinct “personalities”, nor that these differences might strongly correlate with
final wealth. For instance, subject “stubbornness” – as measured by the amount of time a
subject is playing their preferred color, but is the minority color in their neighborhood –
varies meaningfully (Fig. 3.5) and is positively correlated with average wealth (correlation
coefficient ≈ 0.43, P < 0.01). Being stubborn at the outset of an experiment (during the first
9 s) shows even stronger correlation with wealth (correlation coefficient ≈ 0.55, P < 0.001).
The number of color changes made by subjects in the opening seconds of an experiment
also varies significantly (Fig. 3.5) and is strongly negatively correlated with wealth (−0.58,
P < 0.001). Together, these results suggest that stubborn and stable players set the tone of
an experiment early.
Player stubbornness warrants further investigation, because it strikes at the heart of the
tension that is a focal point of the experiments – by being stubborn, one might improve the
chances of swaying the population toward one’s preferred color, but one also risks preventing
global consensus being reached in time (and thus forgoing any payoff). It is clear that no
subject was infinitely stubborn: The wealthiest player had their preferred color 28 times
out of 55 successful games but acquiesced to group dynamics and accepted the lower payoff
27 times. All other players acquiesced more often – up to as many as 40 times out of 55.
In the 26 games that failed to achieve unanimity, there were only 30 individual cases of
players defying all of their neighbors as time expired, and only 5 games ended in failure
due to players that defied all neighbors for more than the last 2 seconds of play. Only 3
individual players ever caused this kind of failure; one did it 3 times, but also acquiesced
38 out of 55 times and garnered relatively poor overall earnings. These facts combined with
the aforementioned correlation of stubbornness with wealth suggest that successful players
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managed to be “tastefully” stubborn, and that overall behavior was quite acquiescent.
In addition to the raw experimental data, subjects were given an exit survey in which they
were invited to comment on their own and others’ strategies, and these surveys provide a
rich and often consistent source of insight into individual styles of play. Twenty four subjects
explicitly mentioned starting off by choosing the color that would give them the higher payoff
upon consensus. Twenty seven subjects mentioned either trying to signal others, or noticing
others trying to signal; however, many also found this behavior annoying and said that it
did not help. Twenty-one subjects noticed others being irrationally stubborn, or expressed
suspicion that others were being irrationally stubborn. (Here we use the term “stubborn”
in the informal way it was given in the surveys, as opposed to the formal measure discussed
above.) Three subjects mentioned being stubborn themselves because they did not want
small payoffs. Seven subjects mentioned using different strategies depending on whether
their incentives were weak ($0.75 vs. $1.25) or strong ($0.50 vs. $1.50). Three subjects
mentioned changing their behavior as the night progressed, 1 subject developed a strategy,
and 2 subjects simply became tired. We note that there is no evidence in the data of the
collective performance improving or degrading significantly as the session progressed; for
instance, plotting the accumulated collective wealth vs. the progression of experiments in
the order they were conducted yields an almost perfectly linear curve.
Finally, 27 subjects mentioned following the action choices of their high degree neighbors
and/or being more stubborn when they themselves had high degree. It is interesting to
note that the average degree of subjects is much more weakly correlated with their wealth
(0.38, P ≈ 0.09) than the stubbornness and stability properties discussed above, despite
these reports of conditioning behavior on degrees. There is no inherent contradiction here,
because conditioning on degrees may appear primarily in the decision on how stubborn and
stable to play.
Despite the observed and reported variations in individual subject strategies, it is in-
teresting that one can approximately reproduce salient aspects of the collective behavior
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with rather simple and homogenous theoretical models of individual behavior. For example,
consider a “multiplicative” model in which a player who is paid w(c) for global convergence
to color c, and a fraction f(c) of whose neighbors are currently playing c, plays c in the
next time step with probability proportional to w(c)f(c) [60]. Such agents combine their
preferences (as given by the values w(c)) with the current trend in their neighborhoods (the
f(c)) to stochastically select their next color in a natural manner. If such agents are simu-
lated using the same networks and incentives as in the 81 human subject experiments, and
the number of simulation steps is capped (as it effectively is by the 1-min time limit of the
human experiments), there is rather strong correlation (0.60, P < 0.001) between subject
and simulation times to consensus.
3.4 Discussion
A number of further investigations are suggested by the findings summarized here. In partic-
ular, the variations in individual behavior and the apparently helpful presence of “extremists”
raise the question of whether certain mixtures of behaviors and attitudes are required for
optimal collective problem-solving. It would also be interesting to use the data from our ex-
periments to develop richer statistical models of individual and population behavior, whose
predictions in turn could be tested on further behavioral experiments.
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Chapter 4
A Behavioral Study on Bargaining in
Networks
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we continue our effort in bringing behavioral experiments to the study of
games in networks. We report on a series of highly controlled human subject experiments
in networked bargaining.
Networked bargaining is modelled as follows: players are the nodes of the networks, and
each edge in the network represents some fixed amount of money that can be realized by its
endpoints if they agree on how to split the amount. This agreement shall be referred to as
closing a deal. In addition, there is a deal limit on each node, which is the maximum number
of deals a player at that node is allowed to close, which could be less than its degree.
We were partly inspired by a long line of previous theoretical work which tried to relate
wealth to network topology in bargaining settings [27, 35, 10, 69, 15, 63, 6, 20]. A notable
feature of these theories is the prediction that there may be significant local variation in splits
purely as a result of the imposed deal limits and structural asymmetries in the network. One
can view our experiments as a test of human subjects’ actual behavior at this game in a
distributed setting using only local information. Our experiments are among the first and
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largest behavioral experiments on network effects in bargaining conducted to date.
As we did for the behavioral experiments in networked biased voting described in Chapter
3, we adopt many of the practices of behavioral game theory, which has tended to focus on
two-player or small-population games rather than larger networked settings. In each of our
experiments, three dozen human subjects simultaneously engage in one-to-one bargaining
with partners defined by an exogenously imposed network. Our work continues a broader
line of research in behavioral games on networks at the University of Pennsylvania[56, 48, 53].
Closest in spirit to the current work is that investigating networked exchange economies [48],
but the experiments here and the theories underlying networked bargaining differ signifi-
cantly from networked trading models.
In an extensive and diverse series of behavioral experiments, and the analysis of the
resulting data, we address a wide range of fundamental questions, including: the relationships
between degree, deal limits, and wealth; the effects of network topology on collective and
individual performance; the effects of degree and deal limits on various notions of “bargaining
power”; notions of “fairness” in deal splits; and many other topics.
The networks used are inspired from common models in social network theory, including
preferential attachment graphs, and some specifically-tailored structures.
In all our experiments, the number of deals that were closed was above 85% of the
maximum possible number. This is high enough to demonstrate real engagement, and low
enough to demonstrate real tension in the designs.
Most of the deeper findings can be related to existing network bargaining theory. Al-
though deals are often struck with unequal shares, more than one-third of the deals are
equally shared, thus indicating that people, while behaving as self-interested actors, also
have an aversion towards inequality.
Network topologies have enough of an effect that they can be distinguished statistically
via individual wealth levels and other measures. Higher degree, for example, tends to raise
bargaining power while higher deal limits tend to decrease it. But while local topology
57
affects bargains, invisible competition also affects it, even when the local topologies are
indistinguishable. We find the expected effects of higher deal limits in the first neighborhood
and higher degrees in the first and second neighborhoods, but neither degree distribution
nor deal limit distribution is sufficient to determine the inequality of splits. In sum, there is
a rich interaction between network and wealth that needs more study.
Other findings that speak to no existing theories but might provoke some new ones are
the following:
• There is a positive correlation between inequality and social efficiency.
• Failures to agree on a split (as opposed to failures to find the best global trade config-
uration) form the greater part of missing efficiency.
• Social efficiency was higher when some uncertainty existed about a partner’s costs.
Finally, there are two curios that seem more about psychological dynamics than eco-
nomics: People who are patient bargainers tend to make more money; and an incidental
asymmetry in our protocol for closing a deal is correlated with a bias in the split.
In the ensuing sections, we review relevant networked bargaining theories, describe our
experimental design and system, and present our results.
4.2 Background
Networked bargaining with deal limits on the nodes, also known in the sociology literature as
networked exchange with substitutable or negatively connected relations (eg. [15]), has been
studied for decades. Several theoretical models have been designed to predict or propose
how wealth should be divided [35, 69, 27, 82], and human subject experiments have been
conducted on a few small graphs (up to 6 nodes) [25, 26, 82], albeit with different interfaces
and mechanisms than ours. Some of the theoretical models are based on limited experimen-
tation, along with simulated human behavior on slightly larger graphs [26]. A few models
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are based strongly on notions of game-theoretic rationality and are natural extensions of
standard economic literature to social networks. Two models that belong to this class were
introduced by Cook and Yamagishi [27] and by Braun and Gautschi [15]. We shall mainly
focus on these two models.
The model given by Cook and Yamagishi, sometimes referred to as equidependence the-
ory, is the most recognized theoretical model, and has received a lot of recent focus from
the theoretical computer science community [63, 6]. Though Cook and Yamagishi[27] con-
sidered only unique exchange networks (that is, where each vertex may close only a single
deal), the model is easily extendable to networks with varying deal limits. Every node is
assumed to play strategically with selfish game-theoretic rationality. An outcome describes
the division of wealth on various edges of the network. The outside option of a node is the
highest offer it can rationally receive from any of its neighbors, such that closing that deal
would benefit both parties, compared to the given state. An outcome is said to be stable
if every player’s earning is more than its outside option. Game-theoretic rationale suggests
that an outcome should be stable if the players act in a myopically selfish manner. Cook
and Yamagishi propose that the achieved outcome must be stable; moreover, they propose
that the achieved outcome should be balanced, that is, two parties that close a deal should
have equal additional benefit from this edge, where additional benefit is measured as the
amount by which the earning of a player exceeds its outside option. Kleinberg and Tardos
[63] showed that a stable and balanced outcome exists on all bipartite networks, but may not
exist in all networks, and if it does, the closed deals in a stable outcome form a maximum
matching. This equal division of surplus is stipulated by standard two-player bargaining
solutions such as the Nash Bargaining Solution and Proportional Bargaining Solution, for
players with linear utilities [75, 11].
Though a balanced outcome seems to be the most robust theoretical model, it has several
drawbacks, first and foremost that it does not exist on even simple networks such as a
triangle; and when it exists, there is a balanced outcome for every maximum matching
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in the network. This makes it computationally hard to even enumerate all the balanced
outcomes in a network, and non-uniqueness reduces the predictive value of such a model.
Another drawback is that the model often suggests that some edges will be shared so that
one party gets an infinitesimal share, and the other party gets practically the entire amount.
For example, a node that has at least two leaves (nodes of degree 1) as neighbors always
ends up with maximum possible profit, due to competition between the leaves. However,
even previous small-scale experiments [82] have suggested that such a phenomenon does not
happen, and in our experiments, players rarely close a deal that extremely favors one of the
players. Thus, when human subjects are involved, perfect local rationality seems to be an
incorrect assumption.
The model given by Braun and Gautschi [15] defines a “bargaining power function” on
nodes that depends only on the degree of the node and degrees of its neighbors. This function
increases with increase in degree of the node, and decreases with increase in degrees of its
neighbors, and is independent of all other network aspects. On each edge, the division of
wealth, if a deal is made, is stipulated to be proportional to the bargaining power of the
adjacent nodes. The bargaining power functions do not distinguish between different limits
on nodes, and generally assume that relations are negatively connected: that is, for any
given player, closing one deal reduces the maximum value that can be obtained from other
edges deals. This makes the model quite inadequate as a predictor for our experiments.
The other feature of this model is that network effects are quite local in nature, since even
slightly distant properties such as the degrees of neighbors of neighbors do not have an effect
on the bargaining power function. However, the model attempts to capture the notion that
the earning of a player depends positively on its own degree and negatively on the degree
of its neighbors. We test this notion on fairly large graphs for the first time, and we also
show that the degrees of neighbors of neighbors do affect a node positively. Such alternating
effects were predicted in previous theoretical models such as that by Markovsky et. al. [69],
which said that odd length paths from a node enhance its earning, while even length paths
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reduce it.
The most significant set of previous experiments were done by Skvoretz and Willer [82],
who conducted experiments on 6 small networks (each has at most 6 nodes), with only
unit deal limits in 4 of them. They found that some common intuitions held true in those
networks. For example, players who have deal limit one and multiple leaves as neighbors
gets the bigger fraction of a closed deal, and that this fraction reduces if the limit of the
player is raised. Among other results, we test such hypotheses extensively on much larger
graphs with much more variance in their degree and limit distributions, and establish these
hypotheses with very high statistical significance. Larger graphs also allow us to study the
effects of network topology aspects that are more involved than the degree or limit of the
player.
Recently, Chakraborty et. al. [20] designed an extension of the Cook-Yamagishi model,
in the setting where there are no limits on the number of deals. In this case, the model
predicts that all deals should be closed, and if players have linear utility (which is assumed
in the Cook-Yamagishi model), all deals should be shared equally. Unequal splits may occur
only if players have non-linear utility.
4.3 Experiment Design Overview
Although we mostly report the results of one session of experiments, we actually ran net-
worked bargaining games in 2 sessions, and one of them had 2 parts.
The first session entirely consisted of networked bargaining games where there was no
limit on the number of deals a vertex can close (in other words, a player at a vertex can
close deals on all edges incident on it). The first part of the first session involved no cost for
closing deals. The second part of the first session had a cost, specific to each vertex of the
network, that the player had to pay for each closed deal. We refer to these two settings as
basic setting and cost setting respectively.
The second session, which we refer to as the main session in the sequel, is the focus of
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this chapter. In this session, there were never any costs involved, but there was a limit on
the number of deals a particular vertex could close. We refer to this setting as the limit
setting. Note that a game in the basic setting can be viewed as a game in the limit setting,
but only if the limit of every node is equal to its degree.
Figure 4.1: Screenshot of player’s interface for bargaining.
4.3.1 Basic Setting
Fig. 4.1 shows a screen shot of the game interface used by each subject in our experiments
in the basic setting. The elements of it will be described roughly from top to bottom. The
game status shows “pending”, “in progress”, or “completed”, which helps the player stay
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synchronized as a series of different games start, stop, and change. The elapsed time shows
the fraction of a minute (the length of each individual experiment) that has elapsed since
active play started.
The large section in the middle contains multiple elements. First, neighbor bands are
green vertical bands that show data about individual neighboring vertices or players in the
network; this example has 3 such vertical bands, indicating the presence of 3 neighboring
bargaining partners.
In the top line is a row of degree numbers, which indicate the number of other neighbors
each one of the user’s neighbors has in addition to himself.
Within the green band there are 2 pieces of data: the offer asked by the user from the
neighbor, and the counter-offer made by the neighbor to the user (the fraction that the user
would receive if he agrees to the neighbor’s offer). Each offer is shown as a horizontal bar in
the green band, with a number above it, ranging from 0.00 to 1.00, indicating the fraction
of the offer. The user can move the offer bar, which appears darker than the counter-offer
bar, which changes only upon the action of the neighbor, and simply conveys information to
the user.
The user can alter her offer to a particular neighbor by mouse-clicking on the green band.
The range of offers is divided into 50 equal parts, so that every offer must be a multiple of 2
%. Initially, the offer bar is set to the highest point in the neighbor band, that is, each user
is assumed to be demanding the entire value of the deal. Moving the mouse over the green
band also indicates the offer that would be made if the user clicks at that point, so that the
user can easily determine the place to click on, to make a particular offer.
Closing of a Deal When a player makes an offer to a neighbor, and the neighbor matches
the offer (which is accomplished by making the offer bar coincide with the counter-offer bar),
then the deal is ready to be closed. We refer to the former player as the proposer, while
the neighbor who matches the offer is called the acceptor. A button labelled close now
appears on the screen of the proposer below the appropriate neighbor band, while a wait
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Figure 4.2: Screenshot of player’s interface for bargaining in the cost setting.
sign appears on the screen of the acceptor below. The proposer can now close the deal by
clicking on the close button. Once the deal is closed, the money on that edge is realized
and split according to the offer that both parties agreed upon, with no negotiations possible
in the future. The neighbor bands on both users’ interfaces corresponding to this deal then
switches color to a faded green, and the offer bars become immovable. The bands also get
labelled as “closed”.
If either party changes his offer away from the agreed split before the close button is
pushed, then negotiations continue.
64
Figure 4.3: Screenshot of player’s interface for bargaining in the limit setting.
4.3.2 Cost Setting
The interface in the cost setting (Figure 4.2 shows a screen shot) had all the features as
that in the basic setting, as well as a section at the bottom of the green band that could be
colored red. The height of the red band indicates the cost of closing the deal for that user.
Since there is only one cost for every vertex, the height of the red part is the same on all
neighbor bands in a single user’s interface. Note that a player can actually lose money in
this game, if he closes a deal where the offer bar lies in the his region.
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4.3.3 Limit Setting
The interface in the limit setting (Figure 4.3 shows a screen shot) had all the features as that
in the basic setting, and some added features related to the introduction of limits. Because
fewer deals could be made due to the limits compared to the first session, we increased the
value of each deal to 2 dollars. At the bottom of the screen, a message tells the user how
many more deals she can close. This number is initially equal to the limit of that vertex, and
is reduced by one whenever this user closes a deal. We call this number the residual limit. A
neighbor band is active only if both the user and the corresponding neighbor have positive
residual limit, else the band is faded out and is labelled “voided”. Further, there is more
information on the neighbor band. On each neighbor band, there are dots indicating the
offers that the respective neighbor is receiving at that time from all its neighbors who have
positive residual limit. Offers on closed deals are not shown. This information is valuable,
since the user is in a sense competing with these offers. If a particular neighbor has residual
limit k at some point of time, then intuitively, at that time, the neighbor can be expected
to close its top k offers. Thus the top k offers received by the neighbor is shown in the
corresponding neighbor band as red dots, while the remaining offers are shown in black.
Intuitively, the user should place her offer so that it lies among the red ones, if she wants to
get considered for a deal closure by that neighbor.
As mentioned the main session of experiment that we focus on in this chapter is the one
of limit setting, and we go on the describe it in detail in the next section.
4.4 Experimental Design of the Main Session
For our main session of experiments, we designed 18 different experimental scenarios (con-
sisting of specific choices of networks and arrangement of deal limits; each such scenario
received 3 trials, for a total of 54 short experiments). These scenarios were based on 8 differ-
ent graphs with a wide variety of details. The sole property they share is that they all have
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a b c
Figure 4.4: (a) PLP network with with LOH = 0.9294. (b) PL0 network with LOH =
0.0013. (c) PLN network with LOH = −0.8461.
36 nodes. We are thus casting our experimental nets wide here regarding network topology,
as in much of our previous behavioral work. This section describes all the scenarios, at least
at a high level.
The networks fall into 2 categories: regular graphs (to isolate and explore the effects
of variations in deal limits), and irregular graphs (which contain an assortment of different
degrees).
4.4.1 Irregular Graphs
We were interested in how bargaining behavior changes with changes in local network struc-
ture, and especially with differences in degree. Out of the huge space of such networks, we
chose four. The first three we describe all had a common degree sequence, but differed in
the way that nodes of each degree connected to nodes of other degrees. We generated a
single degree sequence with a distribution that approximately follows a power law, and used
it to build three graphs with different patterns of degree-to-degree profiles. We refer to these
graphs as PL (for Power Law) graphs.
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Figure 4.5: Schematic for a network with (a) positive LOH, (b) zero LOH, and (c) negative
LOH
Power Law Graphs
Since we suspected that degree might have a large influence on bargaining power (to be
confirmed below), it matters to the success of any node what the degrees are of other nodes
they need to bargain with. Hence it was important to manipulate the degrees of neighbors
as well.
By connecting nodes in different ways, we generated 3 graphs that differ in this manner
but have the same basic degree distribution (each has 2 nodes of degree 6, 3 of degree 5, 4
of degree 4, 5 of degree 3, 8 of degree 2 and 14 of degree 1). The difference in connection
pattern across these 3 graphs is measured by what we call level of homophily (LOH), and it
is defined as follows: For each of the edges in a graph, give it a pair of numbers being the
degree of its two ends arranged with the smaller one first. The correlation between the pairs
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is the LOH of the graph.
• PL with positive LOH (PLP). This network has a large variance in degree distri-
bution but low variance within each neighborhood. This models a ‘segregated’ world.
No edge bridges two nodes whose degrees differ by more than 2. On the other hand,
the graph is highly connected in the sense that there are considerable connectivity
between adjacent classes and within high-degree classes.
PLP is shown in Fig. 4.4a and it has a level of homophily of 0.9294. A schematic of
this network is shown in Fig. 4.5a, where nodes of the same degree are clustered into
a single node, and numbers on the links indicate the count of edges across the two
clusters in the original network.
• PL with zero LOH (PL0). PL0 has the same degree distribution as PLP but has
LOH = 0.0013. This network is shown in Fig. 4.4b and a schematic of it is shown
in 4.5b. PL0 models a world where nodes of different degrees mingle freely with each
other.
• PL with negative LOH (PLN). PLN has the same degree distribution as PLP and
PL0, but has LOH = −0.8461. This network is shown in Fig. 4.4c and a schematic of
it is shown in 4.5c. PLN models a world where the poor are likely to be ‘captivated’
by the connection-rich.
With each of the PL graphs above, we used each of the following 3 deal limit schemes to
obtain 3× 3 = 9 different scenarios. The first is the well-studied unique exchange situation
(uniq): all nodes have deal limit 1. The other 2 are neither unique exchange nor unlimited,
but represent two points in another large space of possibilities in between those notions.
They are best thought of as having random deal limits drawn uniformly between 1 and the
degree of the node. We call them limA and limB, and the difference is just that they are
different randomizations.
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Figure 4.6: The 2ndHood graph for testing second neighborhood effects.
Identical First Neighborhoods
The final irregular graph was designed specifically to test if structure outside the immediate
neighborhood of a node would affect its behavior. The network used for this test has two sets
of three identical nodes, which are colored blue and red in Figure 4.6. Both sets have degree 6,
and each of their neighbors have degree 7, so the local neighborhoods are indistinguishable
in our GUI views. Any differences in behavior must be due to the second neighborhood
or aspects even more distant. The second neighborhood of these two sets of nodes are
drastically different; the second neighbors of the red nodes includes the 20 leaves while the
second neighbors of the blues does not. This graph helped us identify the effects of second
neighborhood when the first neighborhoods of two nodes were identical. We used it only
with all nodes having deal limit 1. We refer to this scenario as 2ndHood.
4.4.2 Regular Graphs
The 8 remaining scenarios were all based on regular graphs. This allowed us to test effects
other than degree, like differing deal limits or large-scale market imbalances. One graph is
a 36-node cycle shown. Four of them are identical tori with different deal limit schemes.
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Figure 4.7: The edges running off the top and bottom denote wrap-around connections, as
do those off the sides. (a) Torus Uniform. (b) Torus Checkerboard. (c) Torus Rows. (d)
Torus Diamond.
Finally, three other graphs were used to observe the effects of a global supply imbalance,
and are described in the following.
Tori
The 4 tori are topologically the same, and are differentiated only through deal limits:
• Torus Uniform (torUniq). In this network all nodes have deal limit 1. It is shown
in Fig. 4.7a.
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• Torus Checkerboard (torChkb). In this network all white nodes have deal limit
1, the others have deal limit 3. It is shown in Fig. 4.7b.
• Torus Rows (torRows). In this network alternating rows have deal limit 1 and deal
limit 3. It is shown in Fig. 4.7c.
• Torus Diamond (torDiamnd). In this network some vertices have deal limit 1 and
some have deal limit 3. It is shown Fig. 4.7d.
Imbalanced Supply Networks
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Figure 4.8: The top line is a template for interpreting the others. Xdeals means external
demand. The “supply” in the 3 names refers to the number deals that the right side wants
versus the number available.
The supply networks are 3 regular graphs which were designed to study the effect of a
capacity issue which is not apparent at the node, but becomes apparent when contrasting
the deal limits of two groups of nodes. Let the external demand of a group be the sum of
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deal limits of the nodes in the group minus the maximum number of deals that can be closed
within the group.
In the supply networks, we defined the groups as the left group and right group as shown
in Figure 4.8. All nodes have degree 4. All vertices in the left group have deal limit 2, and
all vertices in the right group have deal limit 3. In each network, the right group has two
different types of neighbors: those that belong to the right group, and those that belong to
the left group. It is their differential treatment of the two types that was of interest. Nodes
on the left have only one kind of neighbor; they exist just to set up the market conditions
for those on the right.
The three graphs share the fact that all deal limits are either 2 or 3, and the ones on the
right have both types of neighbours. They are different in the ratios of external demands
between the left and right groups; in the Undersupplied case the right nodes are somewhat
starved for deals (seeking 39 when only 30 could be forthcoming), in Equisupplied they are
just balanced, and in Oversupplied they have more offers than they can use.
4.5 System Overview
Experiments were conducted using a distributed networked software system we have designed
and built over the past several years for performing a series of behavioral network experiments
on different games. This section briefly describes the user’s view of that system in our
bargaining experiments.
Like most microeconomic exchange models, the model described in Section 4.2 does
not specify an actual temporal mechanism by which bargaining occurs, but of course any
behavioral study must choose and implement one. At each moment of our experimental
system, and on each edge of the network, each human subject is able to express an offer that
is visible to the subject’s neighbor on the other end of the edge. See Figure 4.1. The offer
expresses the percentage of the benefit that a player is asking for.
When the portions on either end of an edge add up to exactly 100%, one of the players is
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able to close the deal by pressing a special button. Individuals can always see the offers made
to them by their neighbors, as well as some additional information (including the degrees
and limits of their neighbors, and the current best offers available to their neighbors). When
a deal is closed, or when one of the partners has used up his limit of deals, the relevant edge
mechanisms are frozen and no further action is allowed on them. Every game is stopped
after 60 seconds. Any money riding on deals not closed within that time is simply “left on
the table”, i.e. the players never get it.
All communication takes place exclusively through this bargaining mechanism. Actions
of a user are communicated to the central server, where information relevant to that action
is recorded and communicated to the terminals of other users.
4.5.1 Human Subject Methodology
Our methodology for the recruitment, treatment and compensation of human subjects has
Institutional Review Board approval at the University of Pennsylvania and broadly follows
established practices in behavioral economics.
36 undergraduate Penn students were recruited from a related course taught by author
Kearns. Subjects were familiar with simple graph concepts and their role in various real-life
situations, but had no prior knowledge of the particular games to be played.
A single lab with enough Linux workstations for all 36 subjects was used. Each one ran
a browser in a common account that was devoid of the students’ personal distractions. The
computer screens were arranged facing in opposite directions along long tables, so that it was
difficult or impossible to see any other screen. In addition to the authors, several graduate
student proctors were present during the experiments. All players were visible to proctors
at all times, so any attempt to communicate via sight or sound would have been detectable.
No books or electronics or any other materials were allowed anywhere but on the floor.
All players were let into the room together, and instructed to act as though they were
taking an exam. No private conversation was allowed. We gave a presentation explaining
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the game to be played. In the first session, we started with games in the basic setting. It
involved a review of the GUI, the mouse and keyboard controls, the goals of the players, the
fact that graphs were generated according to different schemes not divulged, and the fact
that players would be assigned to vertices in those graphs in an unbiased random fashion at
the start of each experiment. We emphasized that players had no information on the global
topology of any network used.
It was stressed that players’ physical neighbors in the room were not necessarily neigh-
bors in the graph, that the graph neighborhood would change with every game, and that the
identities of players would not be made known during the game or at any time afterward,
including all publications. Then all players logged into their machines. We did ask players to
provide their name, but made it clear that the sole use of that information was to compute
and distribute payments at a later date. One player’s screen was temporarily projected on a
large display at the front of the room while examples of play dynamics were demonstrated.
Questions were taken and answered aloud. When all players were satisfied that they under-
stood the purpose, mechanics, and semantics of the game and interface, we provided two
sample games for them to play in which cash rewards were not given but questions were
solicited.
We then started the sequence of 18 paying games in the basic setting. Each one was
preceded by an empty screen saying “waiting for game”, then the game GUI appeared on the
players’ screens, and we announced this aloud in the room in order to verify that everyone’s
machine was functioning properly. Players became familiar with the local structure of their
neighborhoods in the upcoming game. Their interfaces were live and would take inputs, but
the server would not yet process orders. After a few seconds, we announced the beginning
of the game and pressed a key on the server to enable play. A small bell rang on each
computer, followed by a silent 2 minute period, whose progress was displayed on the elapsed
time display at the top of every players’ applet GUI. A small bell rang when time was up,
and we also announced the end of play aloud. The screens remained frozen in their final
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game state so that players could take note of it. After a moment, at a command from the
server console, the screens reverted to the “waiting” display. On average, less than half a
minute was spent waiting for the next game to be ready.
After these games were completed, we gave a presentation describing the game in the
cost setting, with a review of the GUI and the features added to that of the basic setting.
We then started the sequence of 57 games, in the same way as we did for the games in the
basic setting.
The second session was arranged in the same fashion. After the initial presentation that
described the game the GUI for the limit setting, we followed it up by two demo games to
familiarize the students with the GUI, and then conducted the sequence of 54 games.
At the end of either session, we asked players to fill out an online survey form to record
observations, strategies, complaints, and suggestions about the games, the preparation, the
equipment, and the general event. On average, players earned about $70 in 3 hours.
As noted early in this chapter, this report shall always be describing the second session
(the main session) of experiments unless mentioned otherwise.
4.6 Results
Our results come under three broad categories. The first is about collective performance
and social efficiency. The second category examines questions about the differential fates of
nodes, depending on their position in the networks and the deal limits they each had. The
third category is about the general performance of humans summarizing behavior across all
the games they played. This is an area that no economic theory attempts to cover.
4.6.1 Social Welfare
Humans were quite effective at playing these games, but they paid a surprising price for
their refusal to close some deals.
To quantify how well humans did on this problem, we implemented a greedy algorithm
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for comparison. Given a graph and deal limits, it first generates a random permutation of
the edges, and then checks the edges one by one to close deals on them if this is possible, i.e.
if both endpoints have not already saturated their deal limits. This process is repeated many
times to obtain an average number of deals closed by the greedy algorithm. To normalize
both the human and greedy systems we divide by the Maximum Social Welfare, which is
the maximum number of deals that can close in each network, subject to both topology and
deal limits. The social welfare is the number actually closed, and the ratio between this and
the max is the social efficiency.
The observed human efficiencies are rendered in blue dots in Fig. 4.9, and the corre-
sponding data are shown in Table . In 6 of the networks (those below the diagonal), the
humans did worse than the greedy algorithm. Full efficiency is rare in both systems. One
might view this as the behavioral price of anarchy due to selfish players operating with only
local information. The greedy algorithm obtained an average of 92.14% of the maximum
welfare in our networks. In comparison, human subjects achieved an average social welfare
of 92.10% of the maximum welfare when averaged over all 3 trials, a surprisingly similar
figure.
There are two parts to this story, though, because solving these problems involves both
selecting edges and closing deals on them. The greedy algorithm does not address the deal-
closing issue and perforce never leaves a potential deal unclosed; the humans often did. In
36 of the 54 experiments, the solution found by the human subjects was not even maximal
– there were adjacent vertices that both could have closed another deal. Presumably this
was because they simply could not agree on a split. However, the humans left the system
in a state that could be improved post facto. We started the greedy algorithm in the final
state the humans reached and allowed it to attempt to find more deals, thus producing a
new state with no further unclosed deals. In all cases, this new state had a higher social
efficiency than the greedy algorithm achieved alone. This is shown in the orange dots of
Figure 4.9. A line connects the human performance to the potential human performance,
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Figure 4.9: Blue dots are what the humans actually achieved. Orange dots are the result of
applying the greedy algorithm to the final state of human play, which is what the humans
could have achieved without obstinacy. Vertical lines thus show the price of obstinacy. The
dotted line indicates equality of the two scales. The open circles represent the average values
over all scenarios.
and we might dub this difference the price of obstinacy. In total, 7.9% of the money was
“left on the table”, but 4.5% was due to obstinacy (more than half the lost value).
We conclude that the humans found better matchings in the graph, and hence their
behavioral price of anarchy is lower (better) than the greedy algorithm. But due to their
additional obstinacy, their overall performance was no better.
4.6.2 Nodal Differences
There was much evidence that nodal income depends on its deal limit, its degree, and
properties of the non-local neighborhood.
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network M trials Gr Hu Po
PLPlimA 27 26,24,26 0.94 0.94 0.99
PLPlimB 28 25,24,26 0.95 0.89 0.98
PLPuniq 16 14,12,15 0.9 0.85 0.94
PLNlimA 26 24,25,25 0.96 0.95 0.99
PLNlimB 26 24,22,22 0.95 0.87 0.99
PLNuniq 10 10,10,10 0.93 1. 1.
PL0limA 26 25,24,22 0.91 0.91 0.97
PL0limB 26 22,25,23 0.94 0.9 0.99
PL0uniq 13 12,13,13 0.86 0.97 0.97
cycle 18 16,17,14 0.86 0.87 0.93
Equisup 48 40,45,44 0.91 0.9 0.93
Oversup 49 43,46,46 0.92 0.92 0.95
Undrsup 42 41,41,42 0.96 0.98 0.98
2ndHood 10 10,10,9 0.9 0.97 0.97
torChkr13 18 18,18,18 1. 1. 1.
torDiamnd 23 23,21,22 0.86 0.96 0.97
torRows13 36 32,32,31 0.88 0.88 0.94
torUniq 18 15,18,16 0.91 0.91 0.96
Table 4.1: M is the maximum social welfare possible. Trials lists the number of deals closed
in each of the 3 replications. Gr is the average efficiency of a greedy algorithm. Hu is the
average efficiency of the humans. Po is the average potential of the humans.
Unequal Splits
Most theoretical models (for example, the Yamagishi-Cook model) that apply game-theoretic
rationality to bargaining suggest that deals in some networks will be split in an unequal
fashion. We will report the splits using their inequality value (Ineq), defined as the absolute
difference between the two fractional shares. It ranges from 0 (equal sharing) to 1 (one player
gets everything).
A total of 1271 deals were closed in all the 54 experiments, and 423 of them were split
equally (inequality=0). But most were not split equally, every possible granular division
was used for some splits, and 6 edges even had inequality=1 (which is surprising in itself
since one partner gains nothing by signing the deal). The histogram in Figure 4.10 shows
the inequality values. For comparison, we also show the histogram (in orange) from our
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preliminary session, which had no deal limits and produced an overwhelming portion of
deals that split 50:50. The average inequality value over all games in our main session was
0.2097, which is a ratio of about 60:40, It thus seems clear that deal limits are invoking a
significant increase in imbalanced splits.
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Figure 4.10: The orange distribution was from our preliminary session, and the bar at 0
(equal shares) goes to 82%. The blue bars are from our main session, where we obtained a
much greater spread of unequal splits.
Inequality and Efficiency
There is a significant correlation between average inequality value and the social efficiency
achieved in each scenario — that is, when the subjects collectively tolerate greater inequality
of splits, social welfare improves. These data are plotted in Fig. 4.11 and shown in Table
4.2. The correlation coefficient is 0.52 with a confidence level of p = .027.
Interestingly, in an earlier session of experiments without deal limits, the same correlation
is highly negative.
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Figure 4.11: The 9 PL networks are plotted in orange, and the 8 regular networks are plotted
in blue.
Degree Distribution and Equality
How well does degree distribution predict wealth distribution? We examined the PL networks
to answer this. The average inequality value in closed deals is 0.23 over the 3 PLPuniq
games (where nodes tend to be adjacent to nodes of similar degree), while it is 0.36 for both
PLNuniq (where nodes tend to be adjacent to nodes of very different degree) and PL0uniq
(where nodes tend to be adjacent to nodes of various degrees).
The inequality values of the PLPuniq experiments are less than the joint PL0uniq and
PLNuniq outcomes with a one-sided p < 0.02. This indicates that nodes that have an
opportunity to bargain with at least one other of similar degree have more power than one
that is forced to bargain only with higher-degree nodes. (These are all unique-exchange games,
so deal limit is not playing any distinguishing role.)
These three networks all have the same degree distribution. Hence, degree distribution is
not sufficient to predict inequality of wealth, even in unique-exchange networks.
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network
social
efficiency
average
inequality
PLPlimA 0.94 0.19
PLPlimB 0.89 0.17
PLPuniq 0.85 0.23
PLNlimA 0.95 0.38
PLNlimB 0.87 0.33
PLNuniq 1. 0.36
PL0limA 0.91 0.27
PL0limB 0.9 0.27
PL0uniq 0.97 0.36
cycle 0.87 0.08
Equisup 0.9 0.11
Oversup 0.92 0.09
Undrsup 0.98 0.15
2ndHood 0.97 0.5
torChkr13 1. 0.36
torDiamnd 0.96 0.27
torRows13 0.88 0.13
torUniq 0.91 0.09
Table 4.2: Inequality and social efficiency of each network, averaged over 3 trials.
Deal Limit Distribution and Equality
A similar story holds for deal limit distribution. Even if the distribution of deal limits for
two networks are identical, the experimental results can differ widely based on whether a
node bargains with nodes of similar deal limits or differing deal limits.
In Torus-Uniform, all vertices have the same deal limit. In Torus-Rows, all vertices have
two neighbors with the same deal limit (1 or 3) and two neighbors with a different deal limit
(3 or 1). In Torus-Checker, all nodes are bargaining with nodes of a different deal limit.
The average inequality values are 0.086, 0.13, and 0.36 for Torus-Uniform, Torus-Rows
and Torus-Checker respectively. A means test shows these are all pairwise distinct with
p < .03. These networks all have identical topologies. Thus, when network topology is not
playing any distinguishing role, if vertices bargain with vertices of similar deal limits, the
deals are on more equal terms compared to when vertices with differing deal limits bargain.
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High Degree Confers Power
Over all closed deals in the PL graphs, the fractional take per closed deal of each node has
a correlation of 0.47 with the degree of that node. If, to reduce the confound of differing
deal limits, the study is confined to just the PL*uniq graphs, then the correlation coefficient
is 0.59. Both these correlations are highly statistically significant. Thus, bargaining power
increases with the size of the local market , at least in the setting where deal limits constrain
behavior.
High Deal Limit Undermines Power
While higher degree confers bargaining power, higher deal limits had the opposite effect.
The Torus-Rows graph was designed specifically for testing the effect of deal limit on
a node’s bargaining power. In this graph, all nodes are identical up to relabeling, but
half of them have deal limit 1 and half have deal limit 3. So if there is any systematic
difference between two nodes’ bargaining power, the difference in their limits can be the
only explanation.
In the deals closed by limit-1 nodes, their mean fraction of the deal is 0.57. The limit-3
nodes obtained an average of 0.48. The difference was highly significant. (The two fractions
do not add to unity because not all deals were between the two groups.) If only those deals
between the two groups are considered, the fractions are 0.57 vs 0.43 and the difference is
even more significant. The summary is that a higher deal limit confers less bargaining power.
Effect of Global External Demand
The supply networks were designed to study the effect of external demand. This property
is not apparent at the node, but becomes apparent when contrasting the deal limits of two
groups of nodes. In each supply network, the supply of deals from the left group (recall
Figure 4.8) was manipulated to starve or overfeed the right group. How does the split of a
deal depend on that relative supply?
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In the Undersupplied case the right nodes must compete among themselves for the at-
tention of nodes in the left side, so we might expect their shares to be smaller than the left
side’s. In the Equisupplied case, the external demands are equal, so we might expect no
differential in bargaining power. In the Oversupplied case, the left nodes must compete for
deals from the right side, so we might expect their share of the deals to be smaller than the
right.
external demand avg shares
left right left right
Undersupplied 30 39 0.57 0.43
Equisupplied 24 24 0.55 0.45
Oversupplied 20 14 0.52 0.48
Table 4.3: The average splits shown are for edges between left and right nodes. Edges
between right nodes have an average share of 0.5 by definition.
Table 4.3 shows the results. There is a correlation of −0.19 (p = 0.01) between the
external demand ratio and the deal share of the left nodes. The divisions favor the limit-2
nodes in all cases, consistent with the results of the previous section. However, that local
property of relative limits is modulated by the global supply and demand ratio.
First Neighborhood Effects
We examined the three PL*uniq scenarios to find effects attributable to the degrees of first
(one-hop) neighbors. For both nodes in all deals in the PL*uniq games, compute the fraction
of the node’s take and the average of the degrees of its neighbors. The correlation between
these quantities is −0.60 and is highly significant. Similar results occur when the data are
restricted to just those nodes with some fixed degree.
The clear and consistent story in unique-exchange games is that the share obtained de-
creases as the average degree of the neighboring nodes increases .
The opposite story holds when the first neighbors have higher deal limits. We compared
the 4-regular networks torRows and torChkr. In torRows, a vertex of deal limit 1 has two
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neighbors of deal limit 1 and two neighbors of deal limit 3, while in torChkr, a vertex of
deal limit 1 has all four neighbors with deal limit 3. The mean share of the former was 0.57
while the latter obtained 0.68. The difference is statistically significant with p = .0001. The
bargaining power of a vertex is enhanced when neighboring vertices have higher deal limits.
Second Neighborhood Effects
How does the network effect propagate beyond the immediate neighborhood? The 2ndHood
structure has two sets of 3 nodes, each of which have identical degree and first neighborhood
degrees. The results of the previous section will be mute about how these nodes fare.
However, the second (two-hop) neighborhood of these nodes are drastically different: the
neighbors’ neighbors are leaves for 3 of them, and part of a clique for the other 3. The mean
share of the first group was 0.347, the mean share of the second was 0.571, and the 2-sided
p value was 0.027. The bargaining power of a vertex is enhanced if its neighbors’ neighbors
have higher degree.
4.6.3 Comparison with Theoretical Models
We shall now point out some structural differences in solutions given by theoretical models
and those found by human subjects. For our main session, where nodes have limits, we
narrow our attention to the PL*uniq networks, since the Cook-Yamagishi model [27] was
originally designed for unique exchange networks, and fails to make a stable prediction on the
2ndHood network. The model predicts that maximum social welfare (maximum matching)
will be achieved on all the PL*uniq networks, which is rare in the experiments, as reported
in Section 4.6.1.
Further, the model predicts that a node with at least two leaves (nodes of degree 1)
as neighbors always ends up with 1 − ε fraction of a deal. This is due to myopic, rational
competition between the leaves, where ε is the smallest non-zero amount that can be received
by a node by signing a deal (this is the granularity of offers available in the GUI, and we
let ε = 0.02). Accordingly, the model predicts that there should be at least 30 such skewed
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deals in our experiments with the PL*uniq networks. In contrast, we find that there is 1 deal
where one node gets 100%, 5 deals where one node gets 98%, and only 10 deals where one
node gets more than 90%. Further, all but one of these deals are between a leaf node and a
node of degree 5 or 6. This indicates that extremely skewed deals are much rarer than what
game-theoretic rationale suggests, and is more likely when the degree differences are larger.
In our preliminary session, where nodes have no limits, unequal splits are rare, as reported
in Figure 4.10. Chakraborty et. al. [20] designed a model for this setting. It predicts that
all deals will be shared equally if the players ate the nodes have linear utility functions,
and network effects may arise only due to non-linearity of player’s utility. So the results of
the experiments can be explained in this model if we assume that in our range of payoffs,
the players have near-linear utility functions. This is not very surprising, since a player can
make only a few dollars in each experiment.
4.6.4 Human Subject Differences
Humans were randomly assigned to nodes in each experiment and randomly reassigned in
each replication of a scenario. Hence none of the results above could be ascribed to human
differences. However behavioral literature is replete with examples of how human subjects
leave their stamp, and some traits emerge in our data too.
Patience
The correlation between the average time for each human to close a deal and the average
gain from closed deals, aggregated over all deals in all games, is 0.6664 (p = 0.00). See data
in Figure 4.12. Apparently, patience pays off.
Proposer vs. Acceptor
The user interface mechanism involved the following protocol for completing a deal: one
player (proposer) makes an offer, the other player (acceptor) accepts that offer by matching it,
and then the proposer closes the deal. This was not designed to provoke any asymmetry, but
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Figure 4.12: There are 36 dots here, corresponding to the 36 human players.
was intended to avoid unintended closed deals due to accidental mouse-clicks. Nevertheless,
by looking only at what the shares of the two parties were, can we say which party is more
likely to have been the proposer? We find that indeed we can, and the party which gets
the higher share is more likely to be the proposer. The mean proposer share across all
experiments was 53.6%, and the acceptor share was 46.4%. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
rejects the hypothesis that these shares come from identical distributions with p < 10−14.
Some psychological effect is clearly being expressed by this subtle asymmetry in protocol.
All possible split ratios in closed deals were at least once proposed by someone (and
accepted by someone), with the sole exception of 0:100%. The six cases where all the money
went to one player were all proposed by the high-share side. It may be “irrational” for
someone to agree to get 0, but it would have been even odder to see someone propose that
he get 0.
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The Effect of Uncertainty in Costs
This last section is strictly about our preliminary experimental session, in which there were
no deal limits imposed–so the limit on each node was effectively its degree. Here we found
that social efficiency was higher when the players were simply uncertain about a particular
detail regarding their neighbors.
In the latter half of the preliminary session, we imposed varying transaction costs on
nodes, which a node must pay for every deal it closes. The first half of the experiments had
no costs. Occasionally during the latter half, we quietly imposed zero cost on every vertex.
This allows us to compare those games to the setting without costs.
This cost was specific to each vertex. Only the player at that vertex, but not its bargaining
partners, knew how much this cost was. We varied the costs significantly, from 0 up to 40%
of the value of the deal. This generated enough uncertainty that in the few instances where
every vertex had zero cost, no one could infer the costs of his partner. This 0-cost setting can
be directly compared to the basic non-costed setting where every player knows that there are
no costs involved. Hence the two situations were distinguished only by a lack of certainty.
Players closed more deals in the (uncertain) 0-cost case than in the (known) no-cost case.
The efficiency columns of table 4.4 show the fraction of possible deals that were closed in the
two cases. The fraction went up in all 5 networks; the difference is significant with p = .004.
Evidently, the level of obstinacy rises when people know for certain that their partner has no
costs .
The average inequality values of the deals and the standard deviations are also shown in
the table. We expected the splits to be more uneven in the zero-cost case, but no consistent
story was found.
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efficiency average
inequal-
ity
std. dev.
of inequal-
ity
non zero non zero non zero
PLP 0.85 0.96 0.012 0.01 0.033 0.037
PL0 0.84 0.93 0.009 0.009 0.025 0.029
PLN 0.72 0.93 0.027 0.012 0.057 0.051
CWC 0.84 0.95 0.015 0.023 0.035 0.076
2ndHood 0.84 0.97 0.014 0.009 0.040 0.044
Table 4.4: The CWC (short for cycle with chords) network was used only in session 1; all its
nodes had degree 2 or 3. The others were as described for our main session.
4.7 Conclusions
The background theory is not yet prepared to describe all the phenomena we have observed
here. Some bargaining theory suggests one party to a deal might get an infinitesimally small
share, but our mechanism does not allow this. Hence our results cannot be exactly matched,
but the scarcity of splits that are 98% or above seems to hint that the notion of “rationality”
used by these theories needs to be adjusted. Other aspects of our results support theoretical
models, notably the finding that phenomena at odd and even-length distances from a node
alternately enhance and detract from the node’s earnings.
The findings peculiar to people –namely the prevalence of obstinacy, the value of patience,
the effect of protocol in the closing of a deal, and the state of knowledge about the partners–
are all in need of theoretical development. It seems these findings argue for the further
need to integrate the fields of economics, game theory, sociology, psychology, and computer
science.
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Chapter 5
Network Faithful Secure Computation
5.1 Introduction
Within artificial intelligence and machine learning, statistics, and signal processing, there has
been great recent interest in an important class of highly distributed protocols on graphs
known broadly as message-passing algorithms. Notable examples include belief propaga-
tion [78, 85], Gibbs sampling [18, 37], Nash propagation in graphical games [54, 76], gossip
algorithms [14], survey propagation [16], constraint propagation [28], and many others. More
generally, message-passing formalisms have long been studied in distributed computing.
With rising interest in large-scale, decentralized networks such as the Internet, message-
passing algorithms are of increasing appeal and importance due to their highly localized
communication and their lack of any need for non-local topological information; in most
instances parties do not even need to know the overall size of the network, yet they can
compute sophisticated global functions, such as joint distributions and Nash equilibria.
In many applications of such algorithms, privacy may be an important consideration.
Consider, for example, a large social network in which each node represents an individual
and each edge represents a relationship between individuals. Imagine that each party in this
network would like to compute his or her own probability of having contracted a contagious
disease, which depends on the probabilities that each of his or her neighbors in the network
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have been infected. This could be accomplished by running the standard belief propagation
algorithm on the network. However, if the network participants engage in standard belief
propagation, each party will learn much more than their own probability of contracting the
disease. In particular, each party could potentially learn information about the exposure
probabilities of their neighbors, as well as more global information (such as the fraction of
the population that has been infected). Obviously, such leakage of non-local information
may be highly undesirable.
One approach would be to simply apply classic and powerful tools from secure multi-party
computation [84, 39] (SMPC in the sequel) to the message-passing algorithms, preserving
their input-output functionality while imbuing them with very strong privacy properties.
Unfortunately, this straightforward approach would largely eradicate the benefits of the
message-passing framework in the first place. Most importantly, classic SMPC would im-
mediately “centralize” the computation, requiring all parties to maintain and communicate
distributed shares of every computation in the original protocol — even if these computations
are very “distant” in the network.
In this chapter we seek to get the best of both worlds — the highly distributed, local
communication of message-passing, along with (at least some of) the traditional privacy
assurances of SMPC. Our main results establish that essentially any message-passing pro-
tocol can be compiled into an “equally distributed” protocol that is secure with respect to
individual parties misbehaving (1-privacy), and that security against even small coalitions
is impossible without the cost of some centralization. Thus we demonstrate a fundamental
trade-off between decentralization and security against coalitions that is tight.
We note that if all we ask is that the secure protocol take place on the same graph as the
original protocol, with no attempt to pair states between the original and secure, there are
trivial and uninteresting (and very inefficient) ways of obeying the network structure that
inject security but still effectively centralize the computation. For instance, the network
could simply be used as a global broadcasting mechanism for public keys, and then one
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could simulate the centralized solution of classical SMPC. For this reason it is important to
have a more demanding definition of “faithfulness” to the original protocol, which indeed
our 1-privacy compiler will obey. On the other hand, our notion of faithfulness is also quite
general in that all we require is a matching of informational states for subsets of vertices
between the original and secure protocols; yet we will show that any protocol obeying this
very general definition is fundamentally limited in its immunity to collusion by coalitions.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• A general formalization of message-passing algorithms on distributed networks that
includes all of the examples mentioned above.
• A general compiler turning any message-passing algorithm into a protocol that is prov-
ably secure with respect to single parties (1-privacy). At a high level, this compiler
carefully distributes and propagates the shares of each step of the computation over
just those parties directly involved in it in the original protocol, as well as some of
their neighbors.
• A (parameterized) definition of faithfulness to the original distributed protocol, and
a proof that our compiler produces highly faithful 1-private protocols. The notion of
faithfulness is information-theoretic and simulation-based, asking that views of sets of
parties in the original be computable from views in the secure, and vice-versa.
• Impossibility results showing that the results above are essentially tight — namely,
that protocols that are highly faithful to the original protocol must, in general, be sus-
ceptible to collusion by small coalitions. The generality of the definition of faithfulness
shows that this trade-off is fundamental.
Related Work. To our knowledge, there are relatively few works that attempt to find
constructions of SMPC that preserve more refined properties than just the computational
complexity of the original (insecure) protocol (i.e. polynomial-time overhead). One exception
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is research attempting to preserve or minimize communication complexity [74]. The work
most closely related to ours is that of Kearns et al. [59], who examine limited versions of
the type of results presented here, giving secure protocols without proof for private belief
propagation and Gibbs sampling. Here we generalize their results considerably, and also
provide the aforementioned faithfulness notion and impossibility results.
5.2 Message-Passing Algorithms
Message-passing algorithms have been studied for decades in the distributed computing, ar-
tificial intelligence, signal processing, statistics, and information theory communities, among
others. Several general definitions of message-passing algorithms have been proposed over
the years. Aji and McEliece’s generalized distributed law[1] generalizes many “sum-product”
style message-passing algorithms including belief propagation, the Baum-Welch “forward-
backward” algorithm, the Viterbi algorithm, fast Fourier transform, and others. The defini-
tion we provide here is strictly more general, and additionally includes any algorithms that
fit into the general “message-passing model” of distributed computing.
Let G be a graph with vertices X . For any node Xi ∈ X , we denote by N (Xi) the set
of neighbors of Xi. Loosely speaking, a message-passing algorithm on G is an algorithm in
which information is passed from nodes to their neighbors, propagating through the graph
over time through a series of local interactions. These messages generally include some local
information pertaining to nearby nodes, but may also depend on information that originated
at arbitrarily distant nodes. Formally, we define a message-passing algorithm on G as follows.
Definition 3 (message-passing algorithm). A distributed algorithm on a graph G is a message-
passing algorithm if it can be abstracted in the following way. Each node Xi ∈ X maintains
a current state σ(Xi) which at all times contains its initial input and the content of the
messages it has been passed.1 The algorithm runs in a sequence of rounds. At each round t,
there is a single distinguished node Xν(t) that is central to computation, where the (possibly
1The state is akin to the idea of a view in cryptography, but may also contain additional information.
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randomized 2) schedule ν is fixed before the algorithm is run and is thus independent of the
computation.
Each round t consists of two phases:
1. Message Passing Phase: Let {U1, U2, ..., Ud} be the neighbors of Xν(t). In the message-
passing phase of the algorithm, each neighbor Uj passes a (possibly empty) message
µ(Uj) to Xν(t) where µ(Uj) may depend on σ(Uj) in an arbitrary way.
2. Computation Phase: After receiving all of the messages µ(Uj) from its neighbors, Xν(t)
computes some (possibly vector-valued) function Ft(σ(Xν(t)), µ(U1), µ(U2), . . . , µ(Ud))
and sets his own current state to the output of this function.
After the algorithm has been run for T rounds, each node computes its own local output based
on its current state.
On the surface, this definition appears to differ from the standard message-passing model
of distributed computing, where it is generally the case that at each round of computation,
every node sends messages to all of its neighbors based on its view of the computation,
and every party updates its view based on the messages it has received. However, note
that any algorithm that fits into this framework also meets Definition 3 and vice versa, so
we lose no generality by defining message-passing algorithms in this way. Our definition is
more appropriate for algorithms such as belief propagation or Nash propagation in which
information is propagated over time from one part of the graph to another and back again,
with only a small set of vertices active at any time.
5.3 Secure Computation
Typically, a multi-party protocol is considered private in the semi-honest model of cryptog-
raphy if anything a set or coalition of semi-honest parties could efficiently compute after
2Randomized update schedules are common, for instance, in applications of Gibbs sampling.
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participating in the protocol could have been computed efficiently from their joint input and
output alone. The difficulty of applying such a strong definition to distributed protocols is
demonstrated in Section 5.5.1. Throughout this chapter, we consider the weaker notion of
k-privacy, which requires privacy only against coalitions of size k or smaller. For example,
1-privacy requires that anything a single party could compute after participating in the pro-
tocol could be computed efficiently from that party’s own input and output alone. More
formally, k-privacy is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (k-privacy in the semi-honest model). Let f : ({0, 1}∗)m → ({0, 1}∗)m be an
m-ary function, where fi(y1, . . . , ym) denotes the ith element of f(y1, . . . , ym). Let Π be an
m-party protocol for computing f . The view of the ith party, denoted viewΠi (~y) is defined as
(yi, ri, ~mi) where yi is the private input of i, ri is i’s random string, and ~mi is the sequence
of incoming messages to i throughout the protocol. The joint view of a set I = {i1, . . . , i`},
denoted viewΠI is defined as (I,view
Π
i1
, . . . ,viewΠi`). We say that Π k-privately computes
f if for every set I such that |I| ≤ k, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm S (referred to
as the simulator) such that
{(S(I, (yi1 , . . . , yi`), (fi1 , . . . , fi`)), f(~y))}~y∈({0,1}∗)m
c≡ {(viewΠI (~y),outputΠ(~y))}~y∈({0,1}∗)m
where outputΠ(~y) denotes the output sequence of all m parties after the given execution of
Π and
c≡ denotes computational indistinguishability.
We will make use of the following remarkable and important theorem, which states that
any m-ary function that can be computed efficiently by m parties can be jointly computed
efficiently with arbitrary restrictions on who learns what. The two-party version of this result
(abbreviated S2PC) was first developed by Yao [84] and was later extended to the multi-
party case by Golreich et al. [39] Similar results have also been developed in the private
channel model [9, 22].
Theorem 7 (Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC)). Let f(y1, . . . , ym) be any (possibly
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randomized) m-input, m-output functionality that can be computed in polynomial time. Then
under standard cryptographic assumptions,3 there exists a polynomial time protocol Π that
m-privately computes f (that is, a protocol in which party i or coalition I learns nothing not
already implied by their private input and private output).
The proof of Theorem 7 is constructive, providing a method to transform any polynomial
circuit into a polynomial-time m-private protocol for m parties. Using this theorem, we
could immediately infer the existence of a centralized algorithm for privately computing the
output of a message-passing algorithm. We will show that our highly distributed protocol also
maintains privacy. Our general protocol will rely on local applications of secure multi-party
computation, each limited to only two parties.
5.4 The General Secure Propagation Protocol
In this section we describe the Secure Propagation protocol for securely executing any
message-passing algorithm in the semi-honest model. We discuss how to extend this protocol
to the malicious model in Appendix B.3.
Like the standard protocol for secure multi-party computation, Secure Propagation main-
tains the invariant that shares of each computation are distributed among multiple nodes in
such a way that no one node can learn the values being computed. However, unlike standard
SMPC, each computation in Secure Propagation is distributed among only a small number
of nodes (in particular, a pair of neighbors), thus requiring that the shares be propagated as
the center of computation moves around the graph from round to round. In particular, the
state of any given node is always split between itself and each of its neighbors. The shares
held by the neighbors must be updated each time the state itself is updated, effectively
propagating the new information one step further in the graph.
Assume without loss of generality that the specification of the message-passing algorithm
provides the schedule ν, that each node Xi knows the form of the function Ft it must calculate
3An example would be the existence of trapdoor permutations [38].
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on all rounds t such that ν(t) = i, and that each node knows how to properly calculate
an outgoing message from its current state depending on which neighbor is requesting the
message.4 Let D(Xi) ∈ N (Xi) denote a special distinguished neighbor of Xi, and assume
that this neighbor has already been chosen for every i. The role of the distinguished neighbor
will be to help maintain security whenever Xi is required to perform a computation.
Before the main protocol begins, each node Xi generates a public key pk(Xi) and corre-
sponding secret key sk(Xi) using a key generation function G from any semantically secure
public key encryption scheme and its random tape. Xi then distributes its public key to
each of its neighbors, who in turn distribute it to each of their neighbors. The necessity of
distributing keys to nodes two hops away in the graph is discussed in Section 5.5.1.
Throughout the execution of Secure Propagation, we will maintain the invariant that the
state σ(Xi) is split between Xi and each of its neighbors. More specifically, we assume that
Xi is in possession of σ0(Xi) and that each neighbor of Xi is in possession of σ1(Xi), where
σ(Xi) = σ0(Xi) ⊕ σ1(Xi). Thus, at the beginning of the protocol, each node Xi must split
its initial state (i.e. its input) between itself and each of its neighbors. It can do this by
generating σ0(Xi) uniformly at random from all strings of the appropriate length, setting
σ1(Xi) = σ(Xi)⊕ σ0(Xi), and distributing σ1(Xi) to each neighbor.
Now, at each round t of the message-passing algorithm, there will be some node Xi
with neighbors {U1, . . . , Ud} that needs to compute Ft(σ(Xi), µ(U1), µ(U2), . . . , µ(Ud)). This
first requires computing each of the incoming messages. For each Uj ∈ N (Xi), Xi and Uj
together have enough information to compute the message µ(Uj) since this depends only on
σ(Uj) which is split between them. Thus by Theorem 7 we know it is possible to construct
a protocol for them to perform this computation in such a way that Xi learns only a value
µ0(Uj) and Uj learns only a value µ1(Uj), where µ0(Uj) and µ1(Uj) are each distributed
uniformly at random and µ(Uj) = µ0(Uj)⊕ µ1(Uj).
4This information should all be specified in the description of the particular message-passing algorithm.
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Algorithm 3 The Secure Propagation protocol for the semi-honest model
// Input: Schedule ν, functions Ft for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T},
// and a protocol for computing messages at each rounds
// Generation and distribution of public keys
for all nodes Xi do
Xi generate public key pk(Xi) and secret key sk(Xi) using generation function G
Xi passes pk(Xi) to each Uj ∈ N (Xi), who in turn passes it to each node in N (Uj)
end for
// Initial distribution of state information
for all nodes Xi do
Xi generates σ0(Xi) uniformly at random
Xi sets σ1(Xi)← σ(Xi)⊕ σ0(Xi) and sends σ1(Xi) to each Uj ∈ N (Xi)
end for
// The main protocol
for t = 1 to T do
Set i← ν(t)
for all Uj ∈ N (Xi) do
// Calculate the incoming messages for Xi
// Here µ(Uj) = µ0(Uj)⊕ µ1(Uj)
Xi and Uj engage in S2PC; Xi learns µ0(Uj); Uj learns µ1(Uj)
if Uj 6= D(Xi) then
Uj sets µ
∗
1(Uj) = Encpk(D(Xi))(µ1(Uj)) and sends µ
∗
1(Uj) to Xi
Xi sends µ
∗
1(Uj) to D(Xi)
D(Xi) learns µ1(Uj) = Decsk(D(Xi))(µ∗1(Uj))
end if
end for
// Privately calculate the updated state for node Xi
// Here σ(Xi) = σ0(Xi)⊕ σ1(Xi) = Ft(σ(Xi), µ(U1), µ(U2), . . . , µ(Ud))
Xi and D(Xi) engage in S2PC; Xi learns σ0(Xi); D(Xi) learns σ1(Xi)
for all Uj ∈ N (Xi)\D(Xi) do
// Redistribute shares of Xi’s state to all of its neighbors
D(Xi) sets σ∗1(Xi) = Encpk(Uj)(σ1(Xi)) and sends σ∗1(Xi) to Xi
Xi sends σ
∗
1(Xi) to Uj
Uj learns σ1(Xi) = Decsk(Uj)(σ
∗
1(Xi))
end for
end for
// Final calculation and distribution of output
// The final output for Xi is assumed to depend only on σ(Xi)
for all nodes Xi do
Xi and D(Xi) engage in S2PC; Xi learns its final output; D(Xi) learns nothing
end for
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Now that µ(Uj) is split between Xi and Uj for each Uj ∈ N (Xi), it would be simple to
again invoke Theorem 7 to show that there is a protocol for Xi and all of its neighbors to
together securely compute the value of the function Ft. However, we would like to limit the
applications of secure two-party computation to only take place only between pairs of nodes
that are neighbors on the graph, and not require that it is applied to entire neighborhoods.
We will accomplish this by transferring shares of information about the messages of each of
Xi’s neighbors to the distinguished neighbor D(Xi). Specifically, each Uj ∈ N (Xi) such that
Uj 6= D(Xi) encrypts µ1(Uj) using the public key of D(Xi). It sends this encrypted share of
its message to Xi who passes it on to D(Xi). D(Xi) can decrypt the share using its secret
key and obtain µ1(Uj).
Once D(Xi) is in possession of these message shares for each neighbor, it is easy to see
that Xi and D(Xi) will together be able to compute the value of the function Ft securely
and calculate the new value of Xi’s state, σ(Xi) ← Ft(σ(Xi), µ(U1), µ(U2), . . . , µ(Ud)). By
Theorem 7, there is a way for them to compute it such that Xi learns only the new value
σ0(Xi) and D(Xi) learns only the new value σ1(Xi), where σ0(Xi) and σ1(Xi) are each
distributed uniformly at random and σ(Xi) = σ0(Xi)⊕ σ1(Xi).
Finally, to maintain the invariant, the new value of σ1(Xi) must be distributed to the
other neighbors of Xi. This can also be accomplished using public key encryption; D(Xi)
encrypts σ1(Xi) using the public keys of each of Xi’s neighbors and passes the encrypted
shares to Xi who in turn passes them to the neighbors.
Once all T rounds have been completed, each node Xi and its distinguished neighbor
can engage in S2PC one last time in order to allow Xi to learn its final output based on its
current state. A complete formal description of the Secure Propagation protocol is given in
Algorithm 3.
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5.4.1 Proof of 1-Privacy
Theorem 8. The Secure Propagation protocol 1-privately computes the output of a general
message-passing algorithm in the semi-honest model. Furthermore, all communication takes
place only between nodes that are neighbors on the original graph, and SMPC is never invoked
on more than two parties.
Proof. First, it is easy to see that Secure Propagation does in fact compute the same output
as the original message-passing protocol; the proof of this, which is quite straight-forward,
is omitted.
In order to show that Secure Propagation is 1-private (i.e. that it meets Definition 4 with
k = 1), we must show that it is possible to simulate the view of any individual party given
only this party’s private input and output. The argument used here relies on the standard
notion of an oracle-aided protocol. (See, for example, Volume II of Goldreich’s Introduction
to Cryptography [38].) For each node Xi, we will first show that Xi’s view of the protocol
can be simulated if each invocation of secure two-party computation is treated as a black box
or oracle call. Then, using the fact that any application of secure two-party computation
involving m parties is known to be m-private, we will show that the full view of Xi in Secure
Propagation can also be simulated.
Imagine an oracle-aided protocol ΠO in which each application of S2PC is replaced with
an oracle call where the values returned to each node by the oracle are the output values the
nodes would have received from a real application of S2PC. We must show that it is possible
to simulate the view of any node Xi during this oracle-aided protocol. Recall that the view
of Xi consists of Xi’s input, random bits, and incoming communication from other parties;
we must then show that given Xi’s input and randomness, we can simulate the incoming
communication in such a way that the simulated view is computationally indistinguishable
from the true view. We show how to simulate each message received by Xi during the
protocol.
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First, it is necessary to simulate the initial key generation and swapping phase. Since
each node in the graph is assumed to generate its public and private keys from a fixed
generator G, Xi can simulate this phase by generating public and private key pairs for itself
and for every other node within two hops using G. Xi can simulate the one-time messages
received from the nodes two hops away using the generated public keys; the secret keys can
be discarded.
Throughout the remainder of the protocol, Xi will receive two types of messages: those
which (by design) appear to be distributed uniformly at random (i.e. the shares of states and
messages that are the results of local applications of S2PC), and those that are encrypted
by its neighbors or its neighbors’ neighbors (i.e. the encryptions of the message shares and
the encryptions of the state shares). The former can clearly be simulated by drawing values
uniformly at random; by design, these new values will be computationally indistinguishable
from the shares returned by the S2PC applications.
To simulate a message that is encrypted using the public key of node Xj, the simulator
simply generates a random string m and uses the value Encpk′(Xj)(m) where pk
′(Xj) is the
simulated public key for Xj that was generated during the simulation of the key distribution
phase above. As discussed in Appendix B.1, it is the case that for any semantically secure
encryption scheme, for any two strings m and m′, the encryption of m is computationally
indistinguishable from the encryption of m′. Since the simulated value pk′(Xj) is drawn from
the same distribution as the public key pk(Xj) used in an actual execution of the protocol,
Encpk′(Xj)(m) will be computationally indistinguishable from the true message received by
Xi.
Note that on rounds in which Xi plays the role of the distinguished neighbor, it will be
necessary to deal with the case in which Xj = Xi. In this case, we additionally need to
make sure that the decryption of Encpk′(Xj)(m) is computationally indistinguishable from its
counterpart in a real execution of the protocol. Because m was chosen uniformly at random,
the decryption of Encpk′(Xj)(m) will of course yield a value that is distributed uniformly –
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but this will also be the case in the real execution, since the decrypted values will be message
shares that are distributed uniformly at random from the perspective of Xi.
We have shown how to design a simulator SOi to simulate the view ofXi in the oracle-aided
protocol ΠO. Let f1, . . . , f` be the functions computed by the ` applications of S2PC in which
Xi is involved. By Theorem 7, we can construct private two-party protocols Π
f1 , . . . ,Πf` to
execute each of these computations. Furthermore, from Definition 4, we know there must
exist polynomial-time computable functions Sf1i , . . . , S
f`
i that simulate the view of Xi in each
of these protocols.
Let Π be the Secure Propagation protocol. By definition, this protocol is simply the
oracle-aided protocol ΠO with the protocol Πfi plugged in for each application of S2PC for
computing fi. Consider a simulator Si designed as follows. Run the simulator S
O
i as defined
above, but in place of each oracle call, run the appropriate simulator Sfii with the input and
output produced by SOi . We will show that the view of Xi in Π must be computationally
indistinguishable from the output of the simulator Si using a hybrid argument.
For j = 1, . . . , `, let Hji be a hybrid simulator defined in the following way. Start by
generating the view of Xi in a real execution of the protocol Π. Now, in place of the first j
applications of S2PC in this view, substitute the simulated view of Xi using the simulator
Sfki for k = 1, . . . , j. (Note that the view of Xi in the execution of the real protocol will
specify the input and output of each S2PC invocation and so the simulators can be run on
this real input and output.)
Suppose that the view of Xi in Π is not computationally indistinguishable from the output
of the simulator Si. By a standard hybrid argument (see, for example, Goldreich [38]), it
must be the case that either simulated view of Xi using H
1
i , the simulated view of Xi using
Si is distinguishable from the simulated view of Xi using H
`
i , or for some j ∈ {1, . . . , `− 1},
the view of simulated view of Xi using H
j
i is distinguishable from the simulated view of
Xi using H
j+1
i . The second and third scenarios cannot occur due to Theorem 7. The first
scenario cannot occur due to the above proof that the output of SOi is computationally
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indistinguishable from the view of Xi in Π
O. Thus it must be the case that the view of Xi
in Π is computationally indistinguishable from the output of the simulator Si, and Secure
Propagation is secure.
5.5 Faithfulness vs. Privacy
In this section, we illustrate the fundamental trade-off between the extent to which protocols
are “faithful” to their (insecure) distributed message-passing sources, and the extent to
which privacy against coalitions can be achieved. In particular, we give impossibility results
showing that, at least for certain simple functionalities, faithfulness implies vulnerability to
small coalitions.
Let us begin by observing that the Secure Propagation protocol is not secure against
even coalitions of size two. In particular, at any point in the protocol, a vertex Xi and
its distinguished neighbor D(Xi) can together compute the incoming messages from all of
N (Xi). In turn, there are specific instantiations of (say) belief propagation in which such
messages will reveal information about the private inputs of parties arbitrarily distant in the
network.
On the other hand, we would like to argue that Secure Propagation is very faithful to its
message-passing source. But what exactly does it mean for a protocol to be faithful? At a
high level, a faithful protocol should follow the same general communication pattern as the
corresponding insecure protocol. Computations should occur (approximately) in the same
order, and should involve (approximately) the same parties as in the original protocol. We
would not, for example, say that a secure protocol is faithful to the message-passing source
if it utilizes centralized computation rather than allowing the computation to take place in
a distributed manner over the graph. Before giving our formal definition of faithfulness, we
briefly examine some alternatives.
• Proposal 1: A secure protocol Πp is faithful to the protocol Πo if communication occurs
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between the same parties.
While it is clearly desirable that the secure version of a message-passing protocol limit
communication to occur between adjacent nodes on the graph, this simple definition is
not enough to rule out centralized computation. For example, consider the following
secure message-passing protocol. To begin, a special pair of neighboring nodes Xi
and Xj generate public and private key pairs, and pass their public keys to each of
their neighbors. Their neighbors then pass these public keys to each of their own
neighbors and so on, until the keys have propagated all the way to the leaves of the
network. Each node Xk in the network then generates its own public and private key
pair and splits its initial state σ(Xk) into two pieces, σ0(Xk) and σ1(Xk), such that
σ0(Xk) ⊕ σ1(Xk) = σ(Xk). Next, Xk encrypts σ0(Xk) using the public key of Xi and
σ1(Xk) using the public key of Xj, and propogates these encrypted state shares along
with its own public key back through the network to Xi and Xj. At this point, Xi
and Xj together can compute the private input of every node in the graph. As such,
they can engage in S2PC and calculate shares of the private output of each node Xk,
encrypted using Xk’s public key. Finally, they can propogate these encrypted private
outputs back through the graph, and each node can decrypt its own output.
It is easy to verify that this protocol is 1-private, and it does limit direct communica-
tion to occur only between nodes who communicated in the original message-passing
algorithm. However, by centralizing all computation, it violates our notion of what it
should mean for a protocol to be faithful.
• Proposal 2: A secure protocol Πp is faithful to the protocol Πo if it requires a constant
multiple of the number of steps or rounds used in Πo.
In an attempt to disallow such centralized solutions, we could instead define faithfulness
based on the relationship between the number of steps required by the secure protocol
and the number of steps required by the original. For example, we might say that a
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private protocol is faithful to the message-passing protocol if it requires a number of
steps that is linear in the number of rounds of the original protocol. However, such
a definition is still susceptible to many of the same problems as the first proposal.
Many message-passing protocols such as belief propagation, Gibbs sampling, Nash
propagation, already require a number of rounds that is linear in the size of the network.
Thus the same centralized protocol described above would also meet this definition of
faithfulness.
We instead choose to provide a much more general or weaker definition of faithfulness that
we believe captures the right essential spirit — namely, correspondence of local information
states or views during execution. Furthermore, a more general definition is a merit when
proving impossibility results trading off faithfulness for privacy.
The basic idea behind our definition is as follows. We ask that there be two simulators
— one for translating views in the secure protocol to views in the original, and another
for the reverse direction. For any set Y of vertices in the network, given the view of Y in
the original (respectively, secure) protocol, the corresponding simulator can exactly recon-
struct the view in the secure (respectively, original) protocol given unbounded computation
time. The reason for allowing unbounded computation time is that the secure protocol
may of course employ various encryption or other information-hiding mechanisms during
its simulation of the original (as ours does), but with unbounded computation time these
operations can be “undone” to reveal the “real” computation taking place underneath. We
wish to demand that these revealed computations be exactly those in the original. Thus an
information-theoretic definition is appropriate.
Definition 5 (Faithfulness). Let Πo be any multi-party protocol on a network and Πp be a
private protocol for executing this algorithm. Let M be the total number of messages passed
in Πo, and let τ(m) be the point in the execution of Πo right after the mth message has been
passed. We say that protocol Πp is faithful to Πo if there exist a mapping τ
′ from messages
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{1, . . . ,M} to points in the execution of Πp and simulators So→p and Sp→o such that for
every subset of nodes Y ⊆ X and for every m ∈ {1, . . . ,M},
1. With unbounded computation time, Sp→o can perfectly reproduce the joint view of Y in
Πo at time τ(m) from the joint view of Y in Πp at time τ ′(m) and set of random tapes
used by Y in Πp. In other words, nodes in Πp have enough information to emulate the
computation in Πo.
2. With unbounded computation time, So→p can perfectly reproduce the joint view of Y in
Πp at time τ
′(m) from the joint view of Y in Πo at time τ(m) and the random tapes
used by Y in Πp. In other words, nodes in Πp don’t have too much information.
As we shall see, it turns out that the right definition to establish the trade-off we seek is
actually slightly more general, permitting views of Y and all vertices within some distance
` in the secure/original to be used in reconstructing views of Y in the original/secure. We
now give the formal definition.
As before, let Πo be the original, insecure distributed algorithm, and let Πp be the
privacy-preserving one. It will be convenient to think of Πo as deterministic; of course any
probabilistic algorithm can be converted into a deterministic algorithm by giving each party
a random tape as part of their input. For a given set of nodes Y , let N`(Y) be the set
containing Y and all nodes within ` hops of Y on the graph. For example, N0(Y) = Y ,
N1(Y) = Y ∪N (Y), and N2(Y) = Y ∪N (Y) ∪N (N (Y)).
Definition 6 (`-Faithfulness). Define Πo, Πp, M , and τ as in Definition 5. We say that
protocol Πp is `-faithful to Πo if there exist a mapping τ
′ from messages {1, . . . ,M} to
points in the execution of Πp and simulators So→p and Sp→o such that for every subset of
nodes Y ⊆ X and for every m ∈ {1, . . . ,M},
1. With unbounded computation time, Sp→o can perfectly reproduce the joint view of Y in
Πo at time τ(m) from the joint view of N`(Y) in Πp at time τ ′(m) and set of random
tapes used by N`(Y) in Πp.
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2. With unbounded computation time, So→p can perfectly reproduce the joint view of Y in
Πp at time τ
′(m) from the joint view of N`(Y) in Πo at time τ(m) and the random
tapes used by N`(Y) in Πp.
It is not difficult to show that the trivial centralized solutions we have discussed — for
instance, using the network to broadcast public keys to establish secure pairwise channels,
then using these channels to simulate classical SMPC computation in which every party has
a share of every circuit wire — are not `-faithful even for values of ` proportional to the
number of vertices. This is because a centrally located vertex X may see encrypted messages
between distant pairs of parties, and the unbounded computation time allows these messages
to be read by X. In contrast, we have:
Theorem 9. The Secure Propagation protocol is 2-faithful to the general message-passing
algorithm.
The proof involves showing that conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 6 are satisfied by Secure
Propagation with ` = 1 when Y consists of any individual node. Since the view of any indi-
vidual node can be perfectly reproduced independently (with unbounded computation time),
the joint views of any set of nodes can also be reproduced. Building Sp→o is straight-forward;
since messages in the original protocol are shared by a node and one of its neighbors in the
secure protocol, only the views of a node and its neighbors in the private protocol are re-
quired to reconstruct any incoming messages in the original protocol. Building So→p requires
more care, and relies upon the availability of the random bits used in Secure Propagation
by the nodes within a local neighborhood. We now give the proof in the following.
Proof. We define the mapping τ ′ that is required for Definition 6 in the following natural
way. Suppose that message m is sent to node Xi by its neighbor Uj. Unless m is the last
message sent in the current round, define τ ′(m) to be the point at which Uj has already
finished engaging in a secure two-party computation with Xi to compute the shares µ0(Uj)
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and µ1(Uj), and has just sent the encrypted version of µ1(Uj) to Xi who has passed it along
to D(Xi). If m is the last message of a round, define τ ′(m) to be the point at which D(Xi)
has finished redistributing the encrypted versions of σ1(Xi) to each of the neighbors of Xi
through Xi. For the final message m that is passed, define τ
′(m) to be the very end of the
execution of Πp.
We can then prove 2-faithfulness by showing that both conditions of Definition 6 are
satisfied for ` = 2 given this mapping.
Proof of Condition 1. We first show that for any node X ∈ X , the view of X in Πo at any
time τ(m) can be perfectly reproduced by Sp→o from the views of N2(X) in Πp at time τ ′(m)
and the random bits of N2(X). (In fact, only the views of X and N (X) will be necessary; the
views of N (N (X)) and random bits are not needed.) This immediately implies Condition
1 is satisfied by any set Y , as the joint view of Y in Πo can be perfectly reproduced by
reproducing the view of each individual node in Y separately and combining the simulated
views. To this end, it is sufficient to show inductively that any changes to the view of X in
Πo between time τ(m− 1) and time τ(m) can be computed from the view of X and N (X)
in Πp at time τ
′(m) along with the necessary random bits.
To do this, it is sufficient to consider the single node Xi who receives the mth message in
Πo; the views of the other nodes in Πo do not change between τ(m− 1) and τ(m). Suppose
this message µ(Uj) is sent by Uj ∈ N (Xi). In the secure protocol, nodes Uj and Xi engage
in an application S2PCin which Xi learns the value µ0(Uj) and Uj learns the value µ1(Uj).
Because the simulator Sp→o has access to the views of both Xi and Uj, it can learn both of
their shares of µ(Uj) and calculate the value of µ(Uj) itself, which is precisely what is needed
to update the view of Xi in Πo.
Proof of Condition 2. We need to show that for any set Y ⊆ X and any m, the view of
Y in Πp at time τ ′(m) can be perfectly reproduced from the views of N2(Y) in Πo at time
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τ(m) and the random bits used by N2(Y) in Πp by a simulator So→p with no computational
constraints. (Again, the views of N (N (Y)) will actually be unnecessary, though the random
bits will be needed.) It is again sufficient to show that this holds for individual nodes X,
and as before, we prove this by induction on the messages sent.
The base case is trivially satisfied. Now suppose the hypothesis is true for time τ ′(m−1).
It is sufficient to show the view of X in Πp from time τ
′(m − 1) to τ ′(m) can be perfectly
simulated from the view of {X} ∪ N (X) at time τ(m) in Πo.
Suppose ν(t) = i. Assume without loss of generality that the neighbors of Xi are indexed
according to the order in which they send messages to Xi in the current round, i.e. U1 sends
the first message, U2 sends the second, and so on.
We first discuss how to simulate the basic changes in the views of each node between
τ ′(m−1) and τ ′(m) that occur for every message m. We then go on to discuss the additional
view changes that occur when m is the last message of the current round. For any message
m that is not the last to be sent in the current round, only the views of of Uj, Xi, and D(Xi)
change in Πp between τ
′(m− 1) and τ ′(m). We discuss how to simulate the view of each of
these nodes in turn. Note that when Uj = D(Xi), it is necessary to combine the simulation
techniques for neighbors Uj and the distinguished neighbor to produce the new simulated
view.
The change in the view of Uj stems from the application of secure two-party computation
with Xi, in which Uj provides input σ0(Uj), Xi provides input σ1(Uj), and both receive shares
of the message µ(Uj). Since σ0(Uj) is part of the view of Uj in Πp at time τ
′(m − 1), it is
known inductively to the simulator. σ(Uj) is also known, since this is essentially just the
view of Uj in Πo. Thus the simulator for Uj can obtain σ1(Uj) = σ(Uj) ⊕ σ0(Uj). Since it
has access to the random bits used by both Uj and Xi in this application of S2PC, the view
of Uj can be perfectly reproduced.
Now consider the change in the view of Xi. As in the previous case, the simulator for Xi
has already computed σ1(Uj) (which is part of the view of Xi in Πp at time τ
′(m− 1)) and
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knows σ(Uj) (which is essentially the view of Uj in Πo). Since the simulator also has access
to the random bits used by both Xi and Uj in Πp, it can perfectly reproduce the views of
both Xi and Uj in the S2PC application, and thus also µ0(Uj) and µ1(Uj). With the ability
to calculate µ1(Uj), the simulator for Xi can use the random bits of D(Xi) to compute its
public key, enabling it to simulate the encrypted message that is passed from Uj to Xi as
well.
µ1(Uj), and can reproduce its appropriate encryption by first computing the public key
of D(Xi) using its random bits.5
Now consider the case in which m is the last message of the current round. When
this occurs, it is necessary to simulate the additional changes in the views of Xi and all
Uj ∈ N (Xi) that occur when the new state of Xi is redistributed.
First, when the simulator is simulating either the view of Xi or the view of D(Xi), it must
be able to simulate the appropriate view during the invocation of S2PC that computes the
value of Ft. The simulators for both Xi and D(Xi) have access to the view of Xi in Πo at time
τ(m) which contains σ(Xi) and µ(U1), . . . , µ(Ud). As previously discussed, the simulator for
Xi can compute both shares of the messages passed to Xi from each of its neighbors, while
the simulator for D(Xi) can compute µ1(U1), . . . , µ1(Ud), and thus can now also calculate
µ0(U1), . . . , µ0(Ud). By induction, σ0(Xi) and σ1(Xi) are known by the simulators of Xi and
D(Xi) respectively since they belong to the respective views at time τ ′(m − 1). Given one
of these values and σ(Xi), the simulators can perfectly reproduce the views of both Xi and
D(Xi) in the application of S2PC.
Next, when simulating the view of Xi, it is necessary to simulate the view when Xi is
passed the new shares of its state from D(Xi), encrypted using the public keys of each of its
other neighbors. Since we already know that the simulator for Xi is able to simulate σ0(Xi)
and σ1(Xi), and since it is able to calculate the public key of Uj using the randomness of Uj,
5Here we are being somewhat imprecise about how the simulator for D(Xi) is able to calculate µ1(Uj).
This will depend on the precise details of how the shares µ0(Uj) and µ1(Uj) are calculated in the application
of S2PC, which we have not discussed in detail here.
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this case is straight-forward.
It remains to show that the simulator for any Uj ∈ N (Xi)\D(Xi) can simulate the
appropriate change in view when this node receives its new share of Xi’s state, encrypted
using its own public key. Since the simulator can compute the new state σ(Xi) of Xi from
the view of Xi in Πo, and has access to the random bits of Xi and D(Xi) that were used in
the S2PC in which this new state was split into two shares, the simulator can reproduce the
new value σ1(Xi).
6 Reproducing its encryption simply requires the random bits of Uj that
were used to generate the public key.
5.5.1 The Impossibility Theorem
The Secure Propagation protocol requires each node to distribute its own public key to
every node within two hops on the graph, and fails to guarantee privacy with respect to
coalitions of size two or greater. We now present an impossibility result that shows that
such requirements are unavoidable. Specifically, we show that any protocol that is `-faithful
to the general message-passing algorithm cannot be `-private. Thus no 2-faithful protocol
can guarantee security against coalitions of size 2, and furthermore it is not possible to create
a 1-faithful protocol that is private even with respect to individual parties.
Theorem 10. Any protocol Πp that is `-faithful to the original (insecure) general message-
passing algorithm is not `-private.
Proof. We will first show that any protocol that is 1-faithful to the general message-passing
algorithm is not private with respect to individual nodes, and then discuss how to extend
this proof to the case of general `-faithfulness.
Consider a graph with only three nodes, Xi, Xj, and Xk, and suppose that edges exist
only between Xi and Xj and between Xj and Xk. Consider the following (insecure) message-
passing protocol Πo. Node Xi starts with input z, while Xj and Xk start with null input.
6Again, to be more precise here, we would need to go into more detail about how the shares are split in
each S2PC based on the randomness of the nodes. This will be addressed in the full version of the paper.
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In the first round, Xi passes z to Xj. In the second round, Xj passes z to Xk. Finally, Xk
outputs the value z while Xi and Xj output null.
It is clear that if Xj learns the value of z during the execution of a protocol for imple-
menting this algorithm, then the protocol is not 1-private; there cannot exist a simulator
that consistently guesses the correct value of z after observing only the null input and output
of Xj. We will show that during the execution of any 1-faithful protocol Πp, Xj will learn
the value of z, and therefore no 1-faithful protocol is private.
It will be useful to think explicitly about the view of each node at the end of the Πp.
Recall from Definition 4 that the the view of a party consists of the party’s private input,
private randomness, and all of the messages the party has been passed during the execution
of the protocol. Let ri, rj, and rk denote the random strings of Xi, Xj, and Xk respectively,
and let ~mi→j, ~mj→i, ~mj→k, and ~mk→j denote the sets of all messages passed between each
pair of nodes.
Because we have assumed that Πp is 1-faithful to Πo, by definition of faithfulness it
must be possible to perfectly reconstruct the view of Xi at the end of an execution of Πp
from z (which is the full view of Xi in Πo), ri, and rj, given unbounded computation time.
Consequently, it must be the case that any messages passed between Xi and Xj in Πp can be
constructed perfectly from z, ri, and rj, and thus we can assume without loss of generality
that all interaction between Xi and Xj in Πp occurs before any interaction between Xj and
Xk.
At the point when Xi and Xj have finished interacting, the view of Xj consists of rj and
~mi→j, while the view of Xk is still simply rk. Note that rk is independent of rj and ~mi→j
since ~mi→j can be reconstructed from ri, rj, and z. Suppose that there exists an efficient
protocol for Xj and Xk to exchange message in such a way that Xk is able to learn the value
of z. Since rk is simply a random string, this implies that Xj could simulate the role of Xk
in this protocol and efficiently compute the value of z alone. Thus if Πp allows Xk to learn
the appropriate output, Πp cannot be secure; Xj will be able to calculate the value of z too.
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This proof can easily be extended to show that `-faithfulness implies no privacy against
coalitions of size ` or larger for any `. The node Xj is now replaced by a chain of ` colluding
nodes, X1j , . . . , X
`
j . The message-passing algorithm Πo now involves passing a single value z
from Xi to X
1
j , who in turn passes it to X
2
j , and so on, until finally X
`
j passes z to Xk. Xk
outputs z, and all other nodes output null.
Assuming that the secure protocol Πp is `-faithful to Πo, it must be the case that the
view of Xi at the end of an execution of Πp can be perfectly reconstructed with unbounded
computational power from z (which is the full joint view of Xi and X
1
j , . . . , X
`−1
j in the
original protocol), along with ri and the randomness of the ` middle nodes. Thus we can
again assume without loss of generality that any interaction between Xi and X
1
j occurs
before X`j interacts with Xk.
As before, after the interaction with Xi is complete, if there is a protocol for X
1
j , . . . , X
`
j
and Xk to exchange messages such that Xk learns the value of z, then X
1
j , . . . , X
`
j could
together simulate the exchanges with Xk and learn the value of z themselves. Thus any
`-faithful protocol cannot be `-private.
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Chapter 6
Summary of Contributions
This dissertation addresses several fundamental and important questions encountered in
understanding the strategic and secure aspects of interactions in networks.
In our study of secure interactions in networks, we show how to make any kind of in-
teraction over networks secure, while at the same time preserving the local and distribution
nature of these interactions. We give a powerful ‘compiler’ that for each message-passing
algorithm, produces a corresponding secure version that preserves exactly the same function-
ality and communication pattern. We also show a fundamental trade-off between preserving
the local and distributed communication pattern of message-passing algorithms and the level
of security that one can hope to achieve.
In our study of strategic interactions in networks, we examined two types of strategic
interactions in networks that are of fundamental importance, networked biased voting and
networked bargaining, using a variety of different techniques ranging from theoretical mod-
eling and analysis, to behavioral experimentation.
The networked biased voting problem that we study aims to capture the tension between
the expression of individual preferences and the desire for collective unity that is common
in decision-making and voting processes, which often take place in social or organizational
networks. In Chapter 2 we study this problem by modeling it as a biased opinion diffusion
process, we then analyze the model to show that there exists networks where even a most
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minute amount of biased is enough to prevent the whole population from reaching a consensus
in polynomial time, and demonstrate how this can be remedied by a carefully designed
protocol that constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for the underlying biased voting
game. In Chapter 3, we take this game to laboratory to conduct human subject behavioral
experiments. We find that there are well-studied networks in which the minority preference
consistently wins globally; and the presence of individuals with stronger preferences and the
mixing of individuals of opposing preferences both reliably improve the chance of reaching a
consensus. At the individual level, we find that striking the right balance of being stubborn
in sticking to one’s preference is highly correlated with one’s earnings.
We continue our behavioral study of networked games in Chapter 4 with controlled human
subject experiments on the networked bargaining game. Our experiments constitute the first
large scale controlled experiments on bargaining game as a complementary to the large body
of theoretical work on this subject found in the economics and sociology literature, where the
most important premise for this line of study is that sheer topological differences of different
location in a network play an important role in shaping bargaining power. Our experiments
show that degree in general improves one’s bargaining power whereas the limit on the number
of deals one can get into does the opposite. As opposed to what many theoretical models
suggest, we find that not only local structure, but also distant topology also affects one’s
bargaining power significantly in some networks. Our experiments also result in interesting
findings that call for future theoretical development. For example, we find that network
effect as disparity in bargaining power is largely muted when there is no limit imposed, i.e.,
when each individual can get into as many deals as his degree. Other examples include
the observed positive correlation between inequality and social efficiency, and the fact that
human subjects, through only local interactions, actually found significantly more efficient
outcomes than what a centralized greedy algorithm can do.
Our study of strategic interactions in networks continue a recent line of research that
aims to bring together economics, game theory, social science, and computer science to
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better understand how social and economic networks may play a role in shaping important
strategic interactions in networks. In particular, the two sets of behavioral experiments that
we describe in this dissertation are part of an extensive and continuing series that have been
conducted at the University of Pennsylvania since 2005, in which collective problem-solving
from only local interactions in networks has been studied on a wide range of tasks. The study
of strategic interactions in networks is of significant importance because our modern life has
become increasingly inter-connected in myriad ways, be it social, economic, technological and
informational. And this is especially the case in the past fifteen years as the proliferation of
the Internet has made the interaction of self-interested agents almost ubiquitous. Looking
forward, we expect this line of investigation to continue to produce fruitful results that are
of great interest to the economics, sociology and computer science community.
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Appendix A
Some Tools from Probability Theory
A.1 Markov’s Inequality
In probability theory, Markov’s inequality gives an upper bound on the probability of a
non-negative random variable X deviating from its expected value.
Theorem 11. (Markov’s Inequality) Let X be a random variable that only takes non-
negative values, then for any λ > 0,
P (x ≥ λ) ≤ E(X)
λ
.
A.2 Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound
In probability theory, Chernoff-Hoeffding bound provides an upper bound on the probability
for the sum of random variables to deviate from its expected value. It is first published in
[23] and [44].
Theorem 12. (Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound) Let X1, X2, ..., Xn be independent and
bounded random variables such that Xi ∈ [ai, bi] for i = 1, 2, ..., n, let X =
∑n
i=1Xi be the
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sum of these random variables. Then
P (X − E(X) ≥ tn) ≤ exp
(
− 2t
2n2∑n
i=1 (bi − ai)2
)
, and
P (E(X)−X ≥ tn) ≤ exp
(
− 2t
2n2∑n
i=1 (bi − ai)2
)
.
Note it is not required that X1, X2, ..., Xn be identically distributed, they only need to be
independent. And when Xi ∈ [0, 1], the inequalities are simplified to
P (X − E(X) ≥ tn) ≤ e−2t2n, and
P (E(X)−X ≥ tn) ≤ e−2t2n.
A.3 A Convergence Theorem of Finite Markov Chains
In this section, we state a convergence theorem that quantifies the speed of convergence of
finite Markov Chains. To this end, we need to be able to measure the distance between
distributions. We consider a measure called total variation distance. The total variation
distance between two probability distribution µ and ν over the same space Ω is defined by
||µ− ν||TV = max
A⊂Ω
|µ(A)− ν(A)|
The convergence theorem says that the total variation distance between the distribution
of an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain and its stationary distribution approaches 0
exponentially fast.
Theorem 13 (Convergence Theorem). Denote by P tx the probability distribution of a finite
Markov chain over state space Ω at time t given it starts in state x ∈ Ω. If the Markov chain
is irreducible and aperiodic, with stationary distribution π. Then there exists constants
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c0 > 0 and c1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
max
x∈Ω
||P tx − π||TV ≤ c0ct1
For detailed discussion on mixing properties of Markov chains, we refer readers to [3, 67,
66].
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Appendix B
Additional Backgrounds for Chapter 5
B.1 Public-Key Encryption Schemes
A public-key encryption scheme consists of a triple (G,Enc,Dec) of probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms. G is a key-generation algorithm which outputs a random pair consisting of
a public key pk and secret key sk, Enc is an encryption algorithm, and Dec is a decryption
algorithm. We use Encpk(x) to denote the encryption of a string x using public key pk, and
Decsk(y) to denote the decryption of a ciphertext y using secret key sk.
Informally, any public-key encryption scheme should satisfy the following properties.
First, for any n-bit input x, Decsk(Encpk(x)) = x; that is, decryption is the inverse of en-
cryption. Additionally, for any n-bit x, it is computationally hard for a party knowing only
the public key pk and the encryption Encpk(x) to compute x. There are two fundamental
ways to formalize this property [41]. At a high level, semantic security states that it is
infeasible to obtain any information about the plaintext (decrypted message) from the ci-
phertext (encrypted message). In other words, anything one could efficiently compute about
the plaintext from the ciphertext could also be computed efficiently without the ciphertext,
given only the length of the plaintext. For the results presented in this paper, it will be
more convenient to consider the second formalization of security, which requires that it is
infeasible to distinguish between the encryptions of two distinct ciphertexts. In other words,
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the collections of encryptions of the ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable, even
if the public key is given.
Goldwasser and Micali [41] and Micali et al. [70] proved that these two definitions of
security are equivalent. Thus for any semantically secure encryption system, the encryptions
of two distinct ciphertexts are computationally indistinguishable. For more information on
encryption schemes and security, see Chapter 5 of Goldreich [38].
B.2 Public-key Signature Schemes
A public-key signature scheme consists of a triple (G,Sg, V f) of probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms. G is a key-generation algorithm that outputs a random pair consisting of
a signing key sgk and verification key vfk; the verification key can be made publicly known
while the signing key is kept secret. Sg is an signing algorithm, and V f is a verification
algorithm. We use Sgsgk(x) to denote the signed message produced from string x and signing
key sgk, and V fvfk(x, y) ∈ {0, 1} to denote whether y is a properly signed message produced
from x and the signing key corresponding to vfk.
A public-key signature scheme is useful because it satisfies the following properties. First,
for any input x of the appropriate length, Pr[V fvfk(x, Sgsgk(x)) = 1] = 1. Second, it is
computationally infeasible for any party without knowledge of sgk to forge a properly signed
message, even if the party has access to vfk and messages already signed with sgk.
For detailed discussion on public-key signature scheme, we refer readers to Chapter 6 of
Goldreich [38].
B.3 The Malicious Model
Until this point, we have been interested only in the semi-honest model in which it is assumed
that all parties obediently follow the protocol and only potentially “cheat” by attempting to
learn more information than they should from the messages they receive. This assumption
cannot be enforced in many settings. However, standard tools from cryptography, such as
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zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, can be used to ensure that any party who deviates from
the protocol is caught.
At a high level, an interactive proof system is zero-knowledge if the prover is able to
convince the verifier to accept a statement with high probability if and only if the statement
is true, and furthermore if the proof gives away no additional information other than the
truth of the statement. Goldreich et al. [40] showed that it is possible to construct a zero-
knowledge proof system for every language in NP; in other words, it is possible to construct
a zero-knowledge proof of any statement for which there exists a short, efficiently verifiable
proof or certificate. Furthermore, efficient zero-knowledge proofs exist whenever the prover
is in possession of the certificate.
We say that a protocol is secure in the malicious model if it is privacy-preserving and
any party who attempts to deviate from semi-honest behavior is immediately caught. It is
assumed that once a cheater is caught, the protocol halts.1 A privacy result analogous to
Theorem 7 can be proved in the malicious model, stating that under standard cryptographic
assumptions, for any m-input, m-output functionality, there exists a (centralized) protocol
that securely computes the functionality in the malicious model.
In order to extend the Secure Propagation protocol to the malicious model, we make
use of both public-key encryption and public-key signature schemes. As before, we first
need nodes to be able to distribute their keys (both pk and vfk) to their neighbors and
the neighbors of their neighbors. However, since we are now in a malicious model, it is no
longer the case that a node cannot rely on its immediate neighbor to relay such information to
neighbors two hops away. Therefore, a “preprocessing” key-distribution phase involving some
communication mechanism extraneous to the given network is needed to achieve this. For
example, this can be implemented by setting up a one-time direct communication between
nodes two hops away. Such communication extraneous to the network is possibly expensive,
1The assumption that it is possible to halt when a party is caught cheating may seem strange in our
distributed setting, but is often justifiable, for example if there exists an “expensive” broadcast mechanism
that could be used to notify everyone on the network to halt the execution if a cheater is detected.
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but is needed only for the key-distribution phase; the main protocol we describe below limits
communication to parties connected by an edge on the underlying network.
In the semi-honest model, each time a S2PC is invoked between two parties, say Xi and
Uj, the resulting outputs are distributed between them so that their shares sum up to some
meaningful information (i.e a message or a state) in the original protocol. We then rely on
Uj to honestly encrypt its share of the information and distribute it to the other neighbor(s)
of Xi via Xi itself. In the malicious model, we cannot expect Uj to follow this honestly, nor
can we trust that Xi will relay the true encryptions as opposed to alternate forged messages.
Indeed, we will require both public-key encryption and public-key signature to be part of the
S2PC so that Xi in addition obtains as output an appropriate signed and encrypted version
of Uj’s share of the information, and this signed and encrypted messages is then sent to Xi’s
other neighbor(s). This way, we prevent Uj from sending messages that are encrypted from
anything other than his share of the information and we also prevent Xi from forging such
encryptions.
Along with the above modifications, we need both parties in the S2PC to prove that
any inputs they supply to the S2PC are the legitimate ones. This is enforced by applying
zero-knowledge proofs in a standard way.
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[13] Béla Bollobás. Random Graphs. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
[14] Stephen Boyd, Arpita Ghosh, Salaji Prabhakar, and Devavrat Shah. Gossip algo-
rithms: Design, analysis, and applications. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
42(6):2508–2530, 2006.
[15] Norman Braun and Thomas Gautschi. A nash bargaining model for simple exchange
networks. Social Networks, 28(1):1–23, 2006.
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